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ARBITRAGE FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS: HOW FOREIGN
INVESTORS CREATE SUBSTITUTES FOR PROPERTY
INSTITUTIONS IN CHINA
Weitseng Chen †
Abstract: This article revisits the prevailing wisdom regarding property rights
based on empirical research on the behavior of foreign investors in China. The Property
Law did not exist in China until 2007—four years after China replaced the United States
as the most popular foreign direct investment destination worldwide. This seems to
contradict the conventional wisdom about the indispensable role of property rights in
economic growth. This article argues that China’s experiences in fact do not overrule the
orthodox view, but rather shed light on the evolution of the regulatory property regime.
Property rights still matter in China, but the structure of property institutions deviates
from conventional configurations. Focusing on land tenure, this article demonstrates an
institutional substitute strategy adopted by foreign investors to fulfill their institutional
needs. This article also identifies the specific forms of substitutes for property rights and
conceptualizes two general approaches to establishing such substitutive property
institutions—the contract and corporate law approaches. The findings show that the
bifurcated notions of “formal/informal” or “property/non-property” institutions cannot
characterize the dynamic evolution of property rights in China. Unlike the image
conveyed by informal institutions, foreign investors do not operate their businesses under
the shadow of law but beyond the shadow of law by piggybacking on various regulatory
regimes and areas of law. Nonetheless, the institutional substitute as a development
strategy may facilitate economic growth but will not be sustainable in the long term if it
fails to address structural problems caused by accelerating changes in market conditions.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The current literature on law and development and neo-institutional
economics suggests, theoretically and empirically, that the inflow of foreign
direct investment (FDI) is associated with the soundness of legal institutions,
especially the property rights system. 1 This view gives rise to the
†
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School; Hewlett Fellow (2008), The Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford
University. Email: weitseng.chen@nus.edu.sg. This Article benefitted from comments by Michael Bridge,
Amy Chua, Yun-Chien Chang, Michael Downdle, Robert Ellickson, Daniel Fitzpatrick, Kevin Gray,
Andrew Halpin, John Haley, Jedidiah Kroncke, Ji Li, Gregory W. Noble, Dan Puchniak, Mariana Mota
Prado, Susan Rose-Ackerman and Frank Upham. The author also thanks anonymous reviewers for useful
comments and gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Center for Banking & Finance Law,
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1
See Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Roles of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights,
10 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 87 (1996); see also Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON.
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conventional wisdom emphasizing the crucial role of property rights in
economic growth.2 Investors need to be assured that they will get to secure
their investments of capital and assets and preserve a predictable return on
their investments.
In the East Asian region, the development trajectories of Hong Kong,
Singapore and Taiwan echo this theory, except that of China. While Hong
Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan established their modern property systems
during the colonial period, well before their economic take-offs, China’s
total revolutions wiped out most nascent property institutions.3 Nonetheless,
foreign entrepreneurs have gone to China and established successful
businesses since the early 1980s, despite poor property institutions and the
still existing state-owned land tenure. What is even more remarkable is that,
since 2003, China has taken the place of the United States as the most
popular FDI destination in the world. It was not until four years later that
China enacted the Property Law (2007).
How can conventional theories be reconciled with China’s seemingly
unorthodox experience? This article argues that substitutes established by
foreign investors for formal property institutions fulfill various functions
that are otherwise supplied by a state-backed property regime. In other
words, property rights still matter and China does not fundamentally deviate
from the orthodox view. The differences, however, are the exact forms of
property rights and the ways in which the rights are secured. This article
identifies three major types of substitutes related to property—security,
alienability, and dispute resolution—through which foreign investors take
advantage of different segments of the legal system to fulfill their
institutional demands. In addition to conventional property law approach,
this article further conceptualizes two general approaches making these
1113 (1998); see also Simon Johnson et al., Entrepreneurs and the Ordering of Institutional Reform:
Slovakia, Romania, Russia, Poland, and Ukraine Compared, 8 THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION 1 (2000);
Simon Johnson et al., Property Rights and Finance, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1335, 1354-55 (2002); Edward L.
Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1193 (2002); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Establishing the Rule of Law, in WHEN STATES FAIL: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 182 (Robert Rotberg ed.,
2003).
2
See, e.g., Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country
Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL. 207, 210-11 (1995); Richard A. Posner,
Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 1
(1998); La Porta et al., supra note 1; Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, Why Do Some Countries Produce
So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others? 114 Q. J. ECON. 83 (1999); Stijn Claessens & Luc Laeven,
Financial Development, Property Rights, and Growth, 58 J. FIN. 2401 (2003).
3
In Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, property institutions and related legal infrastructures had
been put in place before recent periods of rapid economic expansion. Hong Kong and Singapore
established a well-functioning common law regime during the British colonial period. In Taiwan, a modern
property rights regime was transplanted from Germany during both the Japanese colonial period (18951945) and the early years of Chiang Kai-Shek’s rule (1945-1949).
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substitutes viable, namely, the contract law and corporate law approaches.
Both equate the property law to governing the property relationship.
One example demonstrates the lawyering skills of lay market players.
When foreign investors and locals are forbidden to transfer land by property
law, they may transfer the shares of the companies that own the land through
arrangements based on corporate law. In this way, lands become alienable
to better serve various business needs. This article refers to this as the
“corporate law approach.” In contrast, when neither property nor corporate
law approaches are viable and cost-efficient, investors may access and
secure their property rights by incomplete or even illegal contractual
agreements with locals. Unlike property rights, contractual rights cannot be
enforced against the whole world. Such contractual agreements nonetheless
provide easy access to land and, ironically, their unenforceability creates
functional limited liability for foreign investors in the face of third parties’
claims. This explains why numerous foreign investors have signed land
leases with locals, regardless of whether the lands are legally leasable. An
official investigation in 2010 indicated that 57.49% of the total number of
buildings in Shenzhen, the major commercial hub in southern China, are
built on illegally transferred lands. 4 This article refers to this as “the
contractual approach.”
As such, foreign investors cleverly switch between property, contract,
and corporate law to create functional substitutes in a market where the
traditional property law has been largely absent or incomplete. These
substitutes explain why China has been able to achieve its impressive
economic growth without moving closer to a Western-style legal system.
The findings also show that bifurcated notions of “formal/informal” or
“property/non-property” institutions cannot entirely capture the dynamics
and patterns of the evolution of property rights. In reality each dimension
(i.e., formal, informal, property and non-property rules and institutions) is
dependent on each other and embedded in the others in various forms of
institutional substitution.
To identify the form and mechanism of these substitutes, the author
conducted in-depth interviews with 75 foreign investors, mainly in
Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, as well as their local business partners.
While some interviews took longer to complete, most took two to three
hours, accompanied by occasional half or whole-day site visits and followup interviews. These qualitative interviews uncovered rich evidence and the
complex dynamics of various substitutes that the quantitative approach may
4
Shitong Qiao, Small Property, Big Market: A Focal Point Explanation, 63 AM. J. COMP. L.
(forthcoming 2015).
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not be able to capture, and hence provided valuable insights into the context
and mechanisms of institutional property law substitutions.
The balance of this article will proceed as follows: Part II introduces
the notion of institutional substitutes, and how it connects with various
literature across disciplines. Compared to different schools of thought, this
article contends that institutional substitutes better capture the dynamism of
institutional development in China. Parts III, IV, and V discuss the three
major types of substitutes in line with three major functions of property
rights: substitutes for security of property rights (Part III), substitutes for
alienability of property rights (Part IV), and substitutes for formal property
rights dispute resolution mechanisms (Part V). Each Part provides case
studies for every type of substitute, analyzes how different approaches work
for each substitute respectively, and presents the cost-benefit framework
through which foreign investors choose between property, contract, and
corporate law approaches. Last, before concluding, this article examines the
pros and cons of institutional substitute as a development strategy (Part VI).
Several factors that may destabilize existing substitutes have been identified,
and therefore challenge the institutional substitute as a sustainable
development strategy.
II.

INSTITUTIONAL SUBSTITUTES FOR PROPERTY INSTITUTIONS

Arbitrage may be used as a metaphor to describe the approach
business actors have adopted to deal with institutional deficits in China.
Financial arbitrage describes how financial speculators take advantage of
differing prices in multiple markets by buying low in one market and selling
high in another.
Metaphorically, institutional speculators also take
advantage of different configurations of multiple regulatory regimes (e.g.,
domestic or foreign company laws) or various segments of the legal system
(e.g., property, contract, or corporate laws), piggybacking on the one with
lower transaction costs or lax regulatory standards in order to create
substitutes for the other with higher legal risks. In this way, market players
compensate for existing institutional deficiencies by leveraging comparative
institutional advantages within multiple regulatory regimes, thereby
fulfilling their institutional demands.
The end products are various substitutes for conventional property
rights institutions. This section demonstrates that these property substitutes
have been made possible by a mix of formal and informal institutional
settings based not only on property law, but also on contract and corporate
law. It explores the inadequacy of prevailing theories in explaining China’s
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significant economic growth (Part A), the development of property law in
China (Part B), and the institutional substitutes foreign investors utilize to
compensate for China’s weak property law regime (Part C).
A.

The Missing Dimension: Foreign Direct Investment and Substitutive
Institutions

Economics and political science literature generally identifies two
primary drivers in China’s economic transition. First, re-configuration of
the state-owned land tenure that unleashed tremendous productivity from the
communal property.5 Second, immense FDI that brought in not just capital,
but also know-how to run a capitalist economy. 6 Scant studies have
examined the relationship between the two drivers, though, which also
happen to be the primary parameters for law and development studies, neoinstitutional economics, and contemporary property rights theories.7 This
dimension is missing in the legal literature too.
While not directly discussing the role of foreign investors, several
schools of thought characterize current studies of China’s property
institutions in terms of law and economic development. One common
approach focuses on the legality and equality of China’s property rights
regime by addressing issues of distributive justice and seizure of land that
may impede social and economic developments eventually. 8 Another
approach, as illustrated by the title of a recent paper by Robert C. Ellickson
at Yale Law School, “The Costs of Complex Land Titles,” typically
questions the efficiency of China’s property system, posing doubts on
grounds of institutional complexity and the mismatch between property
resources and people who can best utilize the resources.9 In contrast, Frank
5
See Andrew G. Walder & Jean C. Oi, Property Rights in the Chinese Economy: Contours of the
Process of Change, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA 7-10 (Andrew G. Walder &
Jean C. Oi eds., 1999); YASHENG HUANG, SELLING CHINA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DURING THE
REFORM ERA 6-14 (2005); BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND GROWTH 40106 (2007).
6
NAUGHTON, supra note 5; see generally YASHENG HUANG, CAPITALISM WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE STATE (2008).
7
See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967); see also
DOUGLASS NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD (1973); Kevin Davis &
Michael Trebilcock, The Relationship between Law and Development: Optimists versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J.
COMP. L. 895 (2008).
8
See Eva Pils, Waste No Land: Property, Dignity and Growth in Urbanizing China, 11 ASIAN-PAC.
L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2008).
9
See Robert C. Ellickson, The Costs of Complex Land Titles: Two Examples from China, 1
BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RIGHTS CONFERENCE J. 281 (2012); see also Taisu Zhang, Property Rights in
Land, Agricultural Capitalism, and the Relative Decline of Pre-Industrial China, 13 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J.
129 (2011-2012).

52

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 24 NO. 1

Upham of New York University argues that formal property rights are not
necessary to growth.10 He further asserts that China’s growth would have
been inhibited if well-defined property rights had existed at the beginning of
the reforms. 11 From a different angle, Donald C. Clarke of George
Washington University argues that China’s state-owned urban land tenure
creates similar incentives that would normally be generated through welldefined private property rights.12
However, none of these foregoing conclusions are complete because
the most important players in China’s economic growth are largely missing
from current literature, i.e., foreign investors. 13 What is the relationship
between the two vital drivers of China’s economic reforms (i.e., FDI and
property rights) and what is the role of foreign investors in China’s property
rights transition? In light of the missing dimension of these debates, this
article aims to bridge the gap by examining the role and behavior of overseas
Chinese investors, those from Taiwan in particular, during this process.
Foreign investors from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau have accounted for
the majority of FDI in China and been doing business there since the very
beginning of economic reforms in 1979.14 They have brought in not only
immense capital but also knowledge of capitalism and how to run Western
legal institutions at least one decade earlier than foreign investors from
Europe, Japan and the United States.15
In contrast to legal studies that leave foreign investors out of account,
social science literature has contemplated the role of these early foreign
investors in the process of China’ property rights transition. To begin with,
the literature often applies the idea of trust as a way to facilitate business
10

See Frank Upham, Chinese Property Rights and Property Theory, 39 HONG KONG L. J. 611, 616
(2009) [hereinafter Upham, Chinese Property Rights]; see also Frank Upham, From Demsetz to Deng:
Speculations on the Implications of Chinese Growth for Law and Development Theory, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L
L. & POL. 551 (2009) [hereinafter Upham, From Demsetz to Deng].
11
See Upham, Chinese Property Rights, supra note 10; Upham, From Demsetz to Deng, supra note
10.
12
See Donald Clarke, China’s Stealth Urban Land Revolution, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 323 (2014).
13
It is estimated that more than a half million Taiwanese are currently working and/or living in the
greater Shanghai area. According to reports investigated by research institutes both in Taiwan and China,
Taiwan has been one of the biggest FDI sources for China. In fact, the real amount of FDI from Taiwan has
been underestimated because many Taiwanese firms have been investing through their paper companies in
Hong Kong and other jurisdictions due to investment restrictions set by the Taiwan government. See, e.g.,
NAUGHTON, supra note 5; Jack W. Hou, China’s FDI Policy and Taiwanese Direct Investment (TDI) in
China, (Hong Kong Univ. of Sci. and Tech. Ctr. for Econ. Dev., Working Paper No. 0206, 2002).
14
NAUGHTON, supra note 5.
15
Also, China inherited a German model of property law through Taiwan’s civil code and modified
it with the legal tradition of the former U.S.S.R. to accommodate state-owned land. See Albert H. Y. Chen,
The Law of Property and the Evolving System of Property Rights in China, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CHANGE AND CHALLENGES 81-112 (Guanghua ed., 2011).
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transactions between locals and outsiders. 16 This view emphasizes the
importance of these foreign investors’ shared culture and language with their
counterparts in the PRC and contends that working relationships have been
based on trust instead of legal institutions. 17 Indeed, the conventional
property rights theory presumes the non-trusting behavior of the parties to a
transaction, an assumption that is so fundamental that economists do not
even mention it as an assumption. 18 Given the lack of trust, formal
institutions guaranteed by a third-party enforcer such as the state are
necessary to reduce opportunistic behavior and induce cooperation. As
such, this trust factor may differentiate China’s property institutions from the
conventional view, as the existence of a high degree of trust in the Chinese
context may have reduced the need for formal institutions and led to the
establishment of alternatives.
In comparison, this article brings the focus back to legal institutions to
address the gap in current literature about FDI and China’s property rights
transition. Trust per se is not an independent factor contributing to the
development of institutional substitutes, but rather determined by a number
of other factors, such as the political economy of the property rights regime,
various institutional configurations, and reactions from investors facing
practical limits and institutional constraints.19 As such, the focus on loosely
defined trust should not override the role of institutions, which may
determine the level of trust and actors’ behaviors. A rational American is
unlikely to trust a British stranger and set up a company with her simply
because they both speak English and know who William Shakespeare is. It
is unlikely that those who share a common Chinese culture are any different.
Specifically, there must be additional factors accounting for their business
cooperation. As such, this article aims to unveil the structure of these
substitutes by examining various institutional factors that affect the behavior
of both foreign investors and their local partners. Before discussing the
various substitutes in greater detail, the next section provides background
and briefly explains the development of China’s property law regime over
the past three decades or so.

16

See Martin L. Weitzman & Chenggang Xu, Chinese Township-Village Enterprises as Vaguely
Defined Cooperatives, 18 J. COMP. ECON. 121, 139-41 (1994). For a general discussion, see ROBERT D.
PUTNAM ET AL., MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993); FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, TRUST: SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 75 (1995).
17
See Martin L. Weitzman & Chenggang Xu, supra note 16.
18
Id. at 140.
19
See, e.g., Donald Clarke et al., The Role of Law in China's Economic Development, in CHINA’S
GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION (Loren Brandt & Thomas G. Rawski eds., 2008).
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Development of the Property Rights Regime in China

When economic reforms began in 1979, most land was in government
hands. This state-owned land tenure still characterizes China’s property
system to date. A dual-track land system has also been created and existed
since the beginning of the economic transition: urban land and rural land. In
general, while urban land is owned by the state, the people own rural land
collectively. Nevertheless, the state is the paramount owner of both types of
land, as it still effectively owns rural land through the lowest government
units, namely, villagers’ committees, which own rural land on behalf of the
people. In short, it remains as a state-owned land system.
Some changes in the configuration of the state-owned land tenure
have taken place gradually throughout the reform era. In 1988, use rights for
state-owned urban land became leasable for a very long term and
commercialization officially began. 20 In 1994, local governments were
allowed to further commercialize urban lands by selling leases through
specified channels (e.g., public auction or negotiation) for a well-defined
period of time depending on the purpose of land use.21 For example, the
maximum term for residential land is seventy years, while it is fifty years for
industrial land. Rural land is not subject to the foregoing regime and needs
to be converted into urban land through an expropriation process before any
commercial use. Due to procedural irregularities and a disconnect between
the high market value and the actual amount of compensation for land taken
for conversion, most land disputes that have occurred in China to date stem
from this expropriation process.
A few characteristics of China’s land system evolution should be
emphasized for the purpose of this discussion. First, instead of privatization
of land tenure, the Chinese government accepted decentralization of land use
rights. When economic reforms began right after the end of the Cultural
Revolution, the central government aimed to relieve itself from financial
20

Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Tudi Guanli Fa (2004 Xiuzheng)
7
) 	
 	
  [Land Administration Law of the PRC (2004 Revision)] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 28, 2004, effective Jan. 1, 1999); Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo
Cheng Zhen Guoyou Tudi Shiyong Quan Churang He Zhuanrang Zhanxing Tiaolie
0
4( [Interim Regulations of the PRC Concerning the Assignment
and Transfer of the Right to the Use of State-Owned Land in Urban Areas] (promulgated by St. Council,
May 19, 1990, effective May 19, 1990) (made use rights of urban land leasable and transferable).
21
The PRC Urban Real Estate Administrative Law (1994) provides the framework of this urban land
tenure. Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Chengshi Fangdichan Guanli Fa (2007 Xiuzheng)
0 2
7
) 	
 	
  [The Urban Real Estate Administration Law of the PRC (2007
Revision)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 27,
2009).
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burdens by decentralizing the land tenure system.22 While local governments
obtained effective control over the allocation of land use rights, the central
government insisted on only a nominal ownership of its land tenure. The
central government relied on this decentralized land system as an alternative
taxation mechanism through which it extracted rents from local
governments.
Second, the dual-track land system also plays the role of a social
safety net. Peasants and migrant workers working in the urban areas view
their lands at home as not just economic but also psychological insurance
against an uncertain future, given the lack of sound social security programs
and worsening income disparity. This partially explains why the dual-track
system remains in effect.23 The history of property indicates that the greater
the risk, the greater the possibility that group ownership will be enhanced or
created as a risk-sharing institution.24 This also explains why privatization of
collective ownership has never happened in China. As natural disasters such
as droughts, floods and locust outbreaks remain common, the risks and
losses can be shared collectively through common ownership.25
Third, while literature suggests China’s household responsibility
system (HRS) drove and greatly contributed to China’s property rights
reform, China’s experiences are not particularly unique although the scale of
its commercialization of land is unprecedented. HRS, which was adopted at
the end of 1978, essentially dismantled the command economy and allowed
farm households to take over management of the agricultural production on
their lands, subject to a contractual agreement that they turn over only a
certain amount of procurement after the harvest.26 In this way, HRS greatly
improved the incentive structure for land users. This is similar to, for
example, the pattern of Japan’s land reform in the Meiji period. Like
Chinese peasants in pre-reform years, Japanese peasants in Tokugawa era
22

See NAUGHTON, supra note 5, at 88-90; JEAN C. OI, RURAL CHINA TAKES OFF: INSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 14, 27-28 (1999); MINXIN PEI, CHINA’S TRAPPED TRANSITION: THE
LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENTAL AUTOCRACY 26-27 (2006).
23
The other explanation is that both the central and local governments maintain this dual-track
system mainly because they do not want to give up their monopoly over the rural land, which serves as a
land bank. Consequently, the more the urban real estate market develops, the more the government can
make a profit by converting rural land to urban land.
24
See Deirdre McCloskey, The Prudent Peasant: New Findings on Open Fields, 51 J. ECON. HIST.
343 (1991); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1335-44 (1993); Ron Harris, The
Encounters of Economic History and Legal History, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 297, 312 (2003); Daniel
Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World Tragedy of Contested
Access, 115 YALE L. J. 996, 1027 (2006).
25
These frequent natural disasters have earned China the sobriquet “the land of famine.” LILLIAN M.
LI, FIGHTING FAMINE IN NORTH CHINA: STATE, MARKET, AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECLINE, 1690s-1990s
(2007).
26
NAUGHTON, supra note 5, at 89.
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(immediately prior to the Meiji Restoration in 1868) paid a heavy and
fluctuating harvest tax depending on the lords’ short-term financial needs.27
Hence there was no guarantee that farmers could retain any of the increased
output. When the Meiji Restoration began, a newly-introduced land tax
greatly changed peasants’ incentive structure and unleashed land
productivity, like the HRS has in China.28
C.

Working Out the Substitutes by Property, Contract, and Corporate

For foreign investors, a property rights regime provides three primary
functions that are crucial for their business activities: security of properties,
alienability of properties, and dispute resolution regarding property rights.
Ideally, investors have the capacity to access and secure their property rights
to land in host countries, to transfer their lands when exiting the market, and
to resolve land disputes according to clearly-defined property rights. As the
literature points out, informal mechanisms and institutional arrangements
will fill the gap in a world that is not ideal.29 That being said, the process in
which property rights institutions affect economic outcomes remains
unclear. 30 How exactly do property rights institutions affect investment
decisions? What are the types of alternative property institutions that market
players rely upon? How do individual market behaviors influence
institutional changes accordingly? Answers to these crucial questions are
highly context dependent. This section explores the use of contract and
corporate law approaches to securing property rights.
To explore these questions, one must ponder the original state of
property relationships when examining the way property institutions have
evolved in China. Hundreds of years of Western common and civil law
development were condensed into a period of just three decades when China
began its property rights transition in 1979 to support its capitalist economy.
Property law is a set of rules defining and regulating a bundle of rights held
by various owners. Some of them serve as default rules so that rights
holders may contract out, while others are immutable rules reflecting public

27

Henry Rosovsky, Capital Formation in Japan, in THE INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES: CAPITAL, LABOUR
145-146 (Peter Mathias & M. M. Postan eds., The Cambridge Economic History of
Europe vol. 7) (1982).
28
Id.
29
See, e.g., Upham, Chinese Property Rights, supra note 10; Upham, From Demsetz to Deng, supra
note 10; Robert Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2001); Daniel
Fitzpatrick, Land Claims in East Timor: A Preliminary Assessment, 3 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 135 (2001).
30
See Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. POL. ECON. 949, 988-89
(2005).
AND ENTERPRISE
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interests not subject to contractual agreements. 31 When property law does
not exist or is insufficient, rights holders may simply resort to other basic
legal principles or whatever institution is available for governing their
property relationships. There are generally two options.
First, contract law is a natural option.
By nature, property
relationships are often based on contractual relationships, from which
property rights further develop distinctive rules for facilitating the use of
assets. 32 One typical example is lease. Viewed as a property right,
especially in common law, lease used to be categorized as a normal contract
right in civil law.33 To better protect tenants against subsequent transferees
of the property, the civil law world has incrementally transformed lease into
a “propertized contract” with third-party effects similar to that of a property
right.34 Even to date, the relationship between contract and property law in
both civil and common laws remains in a state of flux in some subject
matters (e.g., whether covenants bind successors of the original promisor).
Nevertheless, the bottom line is that a property owner cannot benefit from
protection under property laws if he or she opts for using contracts to govern
an underlying property relationship. For example, as a rule, contractual
rights do not run with assets and cannot be enforced against the whole
world. Without the support of property registration system, it is also costly
for parties in a transaction to verify and process information about the
property in question.
The other option is the corporate law regime, which is devised to
govern the relationship between multiple stakeholders of business
enterprises regarding their tangible or intangible property interests and duties
to manage such properties. The form of limited liability company facilitates
corporate operations by protecting the properties of owners that have opted
out of the company assets. Similar to the primary goal of property law,
which is to facilitate the use of property through fairly and efficiently
allocating rights and duties to various rights holders, the goal of corporate
law is to fashion doctrines that produce honest dealings between multiple
31

See Ian Rynes & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989).
32
For the discussion of the complementary and distinctive role between property and contract, see,
e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry A. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus
Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1 (2000); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract,
and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373
(2002).
33
Generally speaking, lease is categorized as a contract right in the civil law, but as a property right
in the common law.
34
Yun-Chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil versus Common Law
Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 44 (2012). See also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 32, at S379.
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actors (e.g., managers, officers, directors, shareholders, creditors and
investors) in a way that would not interfere with the business’ efficiency.35
Like the contract law approach, owners of the company cannot directly
benefit from the statutory protection under property law in land; they have to
resort to the company law to seek protection of their shareholder rights in the
company.
Unlike the implicit image conveyed by the idea of informal
institutions, foreign investors do not operate their businesses under the
shadow of law but beyond the shadow of law, by piggybacking on various
regulatory regimes and areas of law. China’s overall rule of law
development also explains investors’ choice of strategy. To attract FDI,
China’s legal reforms began with contract and corporate laws as soon as the
reforms began in 1979. While the former supports a contractual approach to
constructing property substitutes, the latter offers foreign investors with
another option based on corporate law. The following Parts illustrate how
foreign investors have been able to devise the substitutive property
institutions they most desire by conducting an arbitrage institutionally
between contract, property and corporate law.
III.

SECURITY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

The Chinese government has promised common Chinese citizens and
foreign investors the protection of property rights through both legal statutes
and political announcements. Article 11 of PRC Constitution says that
“[t]he State protects the lawful rights and interests of the non-public sectors
of the economy such as the individual and private sectors of the economy.”
Article 13 stipulates that “[c]itizens' lawful private property is inviolable . . .
[t]he State, in accordance with the law, protects the rights of citizens to
private property and to its inheritance.” It further states that “[t]he State
may, in the public interest and in accordance with law, expropriate or
requisition private property for its use and shall make compensation for the
private property expropriated or requisitioned.” Some specific laws
regarding foreign investment, such as the Law on the Protection of

35

One can also apply a contractarian theory to understand the company law and define the
corporation as a “nexus of contracts,” a set of agreements among the constituent parties whereby they
organize their relations. See Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kingship: Comparative
Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599, 1705-06 (2000)
(discussing various theories of the corporation in the context of Chinese-style business organizations based
on kinships and clans.). See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 514 (1985).
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Taiwanese Investment, also reassert that “[t]he state will not nationalize and
expropriate the investment and properties of Taiwanese investors.”36
As foreign investors have been looking for security in their own ways,
these legal guarantees have never soothed them because of poor enforcement
and legal ambiguity throughout China’s rule of law transition. A major
security concern arises from foreign investors’ pursuit of quick access to
land. This was particularly prominent in early years when laws regarding
foreign access to land were extremely ambiguous and foreign investors had
to resort to various approaches to acquire land. One overarching strategy
has been to create a unitary cooperative structure between foreign investors
and locals who have access to land. This section discusses the function of
this strategy (Part A), the role of contract approach (Part B) and corporate
law approach (Part C) in implementing this strategy, and the rationale
behind choices between the two approaches in context (Part D).
A.

Unitary Cooperative Structure as an Overarching Strategy

“I have hired a retired party cadre as our company consultant to take care of these
problems that can only be solved through guanxi, or connections. Why do I trust him?
We share the same interests. He does not want this company down, otherwise he will
lose a stable salary. A local official’s daughter also works in our factory. There is no
other better way to secure our business than this.”
! A general manager of a leading manufacturing firm in automobile industry.37

It is risky to make a land contract with a landowner who happens to be
in an authoritarian state that does not really follow any law of eminent
domain to expropriate the land. Some investors may nevertheless manage to
make the most of this political structure. Prior to the promulgation of the
Land Management Act (1988) and the Interim Regulations of the PRC
Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right to the Use of Stateowned Land in Urban Areas (1990), any land lease and the transfer of use
rights were unlawful even though foreign investors had signed contracts
with local governments. After the enactment of these two laws, foreign
investors needing access to state-owned urban land must sign a lease with
city or county governments. With regard to rural land legally prohibited
36

Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Investment of Taiwan Compatriots on
the Protection of Taiwanese Investment (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 5,
1994, effective Mar. 5, 1994), art. 4, available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/200712/12/content_1383734.htm.
37
Interview with the general manager of one of Volvo’s major outsourcing companies in China, in
Qingpu District, Shanghai (June 2006).
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from being leased, foreign investors can lease it only after the district
governments exercise eminent domain and transform it to urban land.
However, the reality is that before and after the enactment of these laws,
numerous foreign firms have signed land leases with local officials
regardless of whether the lands were allowed to be leased.38 Apparently,
such contracts are sufficient to secure investors’ rights to use their lands.
The question remains: why?
In the face of opportunism, people could mitigate the risks and effects
by altering the costs and benefits of breach, such as exchanging hostages or
putting up collateral.39 The other option is to eliminate the condition of
divergent interests that makes the opportunism possible in the first place—
what this article generally refers to as “the unitary cooperative structure.” 40
Risks exist only because the parties perceive their interests to be divergent.
Absent such divergence, there would be no danger of opportunism on either
side.
After the unitary cooperative structure is established, the interests of
individual transactors become integrated and more identical, and therefore
the dependence on formal contracts and other third-party mechanisms
reduces. The exact form of the unitary cooperative structure varies.
Following this mindset, for example, foreign investors have established
numerous unions with local governments, state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
and township- and village-owned enterprises (TVEs) in various forms: fake
SOEs and TVEs, subcontracting manufacturing factories, equity joint
venture companies, or other forms of organizations. Both the central and
local governments tolerate and even encourage such unitary cooperative
structure, mainly because foreign firms bring in large amounts of capital as
well as job opportunities through these unions.
The remaining sections examine how exactly contract and corporate
law approaches help create the property substitutes based on the unitary
cooperative structure.41

38
See interview with the senior manager of a real estate consulting firm, in Changning District,
Shanghai (June 2006); interview with the president of a real estate group, in Changning District, Shanghai
(June 2006); interview with the market analyst of a real estate group, in Changning District, Shanghai (June
2006); interview with the vice president of the legal department of a land development firm, in Changning
District, Shanghai (June 2006); interview with the governmental official and director of an industrial
management committee, in Songjiang District, Shanghai (July 2010).
39
See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J. L. ECON. ORG. 5, 20(1985).
40
See id. at 22.
41
For the sake of simplicity, this article will use “union” to refer to the unitary cooperative structure
hereafter.
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Contractual Approach: The Case of the Subcontracting
Manufacturing Factory

“The town has assigned a resident as the head of our factory. He is just a symbol of
the town’s ownership and actually never shows up. But the township government
does take care of some troublesome things we face. For instance, whenever the
central government requires us to pay head tax since we do not pay income tax, the
town helps us come up with an ‘optimal’ head count number as the tax base.”
! An owner of a subcontracting manufacturing factory42

One type of early-developed unions between foreign investors and
local governments is the subcontracting manufacturing factory (SMF). 43
SMFs are purely based on contractual arrangements between foreign
investors and the locals (usually the village committees, the owners of rural
lands) because SMFs are neither a legal entity under the company law
regime nor lawful owners of lands according to the property regulations. To
gain access to lands, SMFs are usually formed falsely as TVEs.44 This way
foreign investors can unlawfully lease land from local governments, then
construct plants, import equipment and raw materials, and begin their
export-oriented manufacturing production. 45 Mayors or assigned local
official or residents are the nominal heads of SMFs although foreign
investors actually operate SMFs.46 While their Chinese partners are nominal
owners, foreign investors merely acquire the management rights of SMFs
based on side contracts, the spirit of which actually denounces the corporate
formation and its legality. Although SMFs run like de facto corporations,
foreign investors’ interests in SMFs have no legal basis in the corporate laws
42
Interview with the owner of a subcontracting manufacturing factory, in Dongguan City,
Guangdong Province (June 2006).
43
The origin of SMF can be traced back to late the 1970s. Research shows that it was invented by
investors from Hong Kong. See Lu-Lin Cheng, The Invisible Elbow: Semiperiphery and the Restructuring
of the International Footwear Market, 35 TAIWAN: A RADICAL QUARTERLY IN SOCIAL STUDIES 1, 15
(1999).
44
In addition to access to land, foreign firms may have other potential benefits if they “collectivize”
their firms. In general, SOEs and TVEs, as agents of the state in the market, have advantages over foreign
firms, including (1) low or even no cost for state-owned land and facilities; (2) better security of property
and less opportunity for land confiscation; (3) low bank loan interest rates; (4) more political backing and
business chances; (5) better ability to enforce contracts via non-judicial measures; (6) greater information
to evaluate business risks; and (7) more governmental subsidies.
45
See Walder & Oi, supra note 5, at 7-10; Chih-Jou Jay Chen, Local Institutions and Property
Rights Transformation: Regional Variations in Chinese Rural Reforms, in THE CHINESE TRIANGLE OF
MAINLAND CHINA, TAIWAN, AND HONG KONG: COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSES 63 (Alvin Y. So
et al., eds., 2001).
46
See Cheng, supra note 43, at 14-16; Jieh-min Wu, Human Space Squeezed: Differential Status and
Multiple Exploitation in China, 39 TAIWAN: A RADICAL QUARTERLY IN SOCIAL STUDIES 1, 21-24 (2000).
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and are merely based on contractual arrangements about the use of facilities
and the control of revenues. Some of these contractual agreements are
incomplete and even not formally enforceable. Nonetheless, SMFs have
been commonly used by numerous investors from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
Macau since the early 1980s. SMFs also help explain why the productivity
of TVEs between 1979 and 1991 grew approximately three times higher
than that of SOEs.47 In 2006, for instance, there were still more than six
thousand Taiwanese SMFs in Guangdong province.48
At first blush the SMF is by no means a secure form for investors to
align with their Chinese partners. First, the SMF is not a legal person and
cannot possess the rights that a legal entity enjoys, such as the right to sue in
courts. The SMF can only be designated as a “factory” instead of any
formal form of corporation. Second, making the situation even more
tenuous, foreign investors do not own their factories because SMFs are
officially owned by their Chinese partners in various forms of TVEs that
have access to land and export permits. What foreign investors have in these
unions are contractual rights with respect to access to land, ownership of the
factory production, and de facto control and management rights of the
SMFs. Clarke and Howson, in their examination of derivative action cases
in China, also point out courts’ tendency to rely on pure formalities in
permitting the derivative claim and that the ambiguity of corporate
ownership and legal identity has led to difficulties in protecting shareholders
by derivative actions meant for the formal corporate form.49
Why would ethnically Chinese foreign investors opt for SMFs and
how do they handle the risks and enforce their contractual agreements? To
begin with, the nature of contractual rights, coupled with the
unenforceability of these illegal contracts in question, have functionally
created a form of limited liability to the amount of their investment in SMFs.
As foreign investors are neither legal representatives of the entities nor
official owners of the corporate assets, they bear lower legal risks in the face
of third parties’ claims and hence better control their risks. If necessary,
they can even exit the investment structure swiftly provided they are willing
to endure the losses, which are limited to the corporate assets they have
47
Weitzman & Xu, supra note 17, at 128-29. See also, Yasheng Huang, Debating China’s Economic
Growth: The Beijing Consensus or the Washington Consensus, 24 (2) ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT
PERSPECTIVES 31, 34-35 (2010).
48
Hwei-ming Chen, Material Processing Factories Should Transform Themselves as Soon as
Possible (Oct. 25, 2006), http://pro.udnjob.com/mag2/overseas/storypage.jsp?f_ART_ID=28395 (last
visited July 15, 2014).
49
See Donald C. Clarke & Nicholas C. Howson, Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection:
Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 243, 250-51 (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2012).
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contributed. Here the contractual approach crosses over the corporate law
approach, and creates the core of the corporate form for the sake of securing
property rights.
Furthermore, foreign investors’ security in their property interests in
SMFs relies on an interdependent relationship with the local economy,
giving rise to long-term cooperation. For example, the fact that many local
residents working for SMFs live off the salaries they provide reduces the
risk that local officials and party cadres would confiscate the property of
SMFs. Also, each party may hold information that is harmful to their
partners (e.g., tax evasion records) after a period of business practice in a
gray area, or even one completely unlawful. This scenario, similar to
playing repeated games of chicken, provides investors and their partners
with incentives to maintain unions. This approach involves exchanging
hostages, metaphorically, or putting up collateral to prevent opportunism in
a contractual relationship without strong state interference for enforcement.
However, if the balance of power shifts, then the relationship may turn sour.
As such, foreign investors rarely stop looking for suitable institutional
arrangements or adjusting their behavior to adapt to any condition changes.
Under the decentralization policy that began in 1979, Beijing did not
have too much say about local property arrangements and, therefore, chose
to tolerate these fake collective enterprises. Lacking sufficient capacity to
monitor land use and enforce rules, the central government also faced
difficulty correcting unlawful land use that local governments and foreign
investors commonly adopted. As such, it decided to encourage SMFs by
providing tax exemptions on the import of machines and raw materials, and
to require local governments to submit part of the resulting revenues to the
central government.50 The government also considered SMFs a policy tool
to help transform domestic firms into modern business organizations through
50
SMFs are not regulated by the normal regulatory regime regarding foreign enterprises. Also,
because tax agencies have difficulty in collecting the accounting information of SMFs, SMFs are usually
required to pay tax based on head counts. However, such head count taxes can be easily evaded through
cooperation between local officials and foreign investors. As such, the central government started
discouraging the establishment of SMFs by setting disincentives in the early 2000s. Since 2002, for
instance, SMFs have been required to pay income tax. See WEI JIA, CHINESE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAWS
AND POLICIES: EVOLUTION AND TRANSFORMATION 21 (1994); De-cong Chang, The Analysis of
Transforming Mainland’s Material Processing Plants into Personal-Fund Enterprise, Strait Business
Monthly (2002), http://www.seftb.org/mhypage.exe?HYPAGE=/03/03_content_01.asp&weekid=38
&idx=12 (last visited July 15, 2014);, Legalization of Materials Processing Factories: The Deadline is
Approaching, PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS (2011), http://www.pwc.tw/zh/challenges/invest-in-mainlandchina/invest-in-mainland-china-20110715.jhtml (last visited July 15, 2014); The Chinese Tax Bureau is
Likely to Strengthen the Audit on Transfer Price of Material Processing Factories, PRICEWATERHOUSE
COOPERS (2011), http://www.pwc.tw/zh/challenges/invest-in-mainland-china/invest-in-mainland-china20111021.jhtml (last visited July 15, 2014).
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the introduction of new technology and corporate governance. 51
Nevertheless the central government does restrict that SMFs’ products
cannot be sold into domestic market so that the monopoly of SOEs and
TVEs in the domestic market would not be threatened. 52 When asked what
the judicial system and regulatory authorities should do with hundreds of
thousands of fake TVEs and SMFs in the coastal area, the then-Vice
President of the PRC Supreme People’s Court asserted that unless those
firms bring their legal issues to the court, the state and courts will not
intervene.53 In fact, SMFs are not a recognized legal entity, capable of suing
or being sued and, in practice, the Chinese courts generally refuse to hear
land dispute cases involving local authorities, the business partners of many
SMFs.54
The downside of this contractual approach to securing property rights
in land includes the moral hazard inherent therein and the geographic limit
of its effectiveness. First, SMFs create special dangers and moral hazard in
the short term because, until the bond of intimacy have taken hold and
grown strong, the relaxation of defenses by illegal or incomplete contractual
agreements may increase the risk of exploitation instead of diminishing it.55
Second, the geographic limit of its effectiveness occurs because the physical
and social distance between business partners matters to self-enforcement.56
Property arrangements based on incomplete and/or illegal contracts are only
viable within a certain level of close-knit groups.57 In the context of our
discussions the line is not drawn along family units but roughly by culture;
members within a close-knit group often govern their continued relationship
by relational contracts, ensuring contract enforcement by forming contracts
51

For instance, in the 1980s and 1990s, Beijjng city encouraged Taiwanese investors to acquire
SOEs or develop alliances with SOEs by setting various incentives, such as providing lands for real estate
development or other businesses. See Straits Exchange Foundation, Measures for Beijing City to
Encourage Taiwanese Investment, 36 STRAIT BUSINESS MONTHLY 21 (1994).
52
SMFs are prohibited from selling their products in the domestic market without getting approval
and paying additional taxes, otherwise foreign investors will be charged criminally as smugglers. See, e.g.,
Criminal Trial Precedent No. 268, in 35 REFERENCE TO CRIMINAL TRIAL (Sup. People’s Ct. ed., 2003).
53
Wan Exiang, Former Vice President of Supreme People’s Court, Address at Yale Law School
(Nov. 30, 2006) (answering the author’s question).
54
This policy has been specified in several internal notices issued by the Supreme People’s Court,
provincial courts, and the Ministry of Construction. For example, Beijing’s Supreme Court has issued the
“Beijing Supreme Court No. 106 Document” to specify four types of land disputes that the district courts
should refuse to hear.
55
See Kronman, supra note 39, at 23.
56
See Avinash Dixit, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE MODES OF GOVERNANCE 70
(2004).
57
See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons for
Development Democracies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 237 (2011); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL
NORMS 152-53 (2002).
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only with members of the network and refusing to deal with a partner in the
future if he or she defaults.58
In a sharp contrast with ethnically Chinese foreign investors, nonethnically Chinese foreign investors are often amazed at the adoption of
SMFs and other substitute institutions that are not necessarily lawful. An
interesting interview revealed the difference in mentality between nonethnically Chinese investors and their local business partners. 59 On
negotiating for an American firm to acquire the assets of a Chinese
manufacturer in Guangdong Province where numerous SMFs exist, a U.S.
attorney recalled: “One stumbling block was the [seller’s] company’s
location: the manufacturing operation was in an area zoned only for
agricultural use. The seller attempted to assure the buyer that there was no
need for concern . . . and had experienced no problems [renewing the lease]
with the local authorities.” 60 The buyer also found the Chinese company
had not paid certain taxes; once again, the seller argued such practice was
prevalent in the area: “[I]f a local official knocks on our door and demands
payment, we will negotiate and reach a compromise on the amount owed.”61
When the buyer tried to get the seller to lower the price, “the seller refused,
arguing that it had done nothing that other companies had not done.”62 In
the end, the buyer decided to walk away from the negotiation, demonstrating
a very different mentality from that of ethnically Chinese foreign investors.63
C.

Corporate Law Approach: The Case of the Equity Joint Venture
Company

“A variety of local units came to ask for a variety of fees . . . They just walked in our
office at short notice. They brought with them some Xerox copies of laws and rules that
we didn’t understand at all . . . It’s no way to pay all the money they asked. You
shouldn’t satisfy their appetite. What could I do? I called the people at Xi Ling [the
partner of the equity joint-venture company] for help. Most of the time, they solved the
problems quickly. We’ve been paying them a great deal of money. If they don’t take
care of the troubles, what else do we need them for?”

58
See Simon Johnson et al., Courts and Relational Contracts, J. L. ECON. & ORG. 18 (2002); Ronald
J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and
Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. R. 1377, 1392 (2010); Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 57, at 236.
59
See Nancy T. Avedissian, Chinese M & A: Green Light or Red Flag? 32 CHINA BUS. REV. 26, 26
(2005).
60
See id.
61
See id.
62
See id.
63
See id.
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! A manager of a Taiwanese firm based in Xizhu City, Guangdong Province64

The early development of China’s corporate law system also enables
foreign investors to secure property rights by piggybacking on the corporate
law regime. Over time, the equity joint venture company (“JV company”)
became another popular type of union for investors and local enterprises.65
The JV company is incorporated legally pursuant to the Chinese-Foreign
Contractual Joint Ventures Law (1988), one of a few early legislative efforts
catering to foreign investors. Two other special laws have set a legal
framework for foreign firms as well: Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures
Law (1979); and, Foreign-Capital Enterprises Law (1986). The Company
Law (1993) also serves as a fundamental and complementary regulatory
regime. By forming different relationships between various actors in any
given corporate entity, each of these laws sets different cost-efficient
conditions for foreign investors to mitigate transactional opportunism.
The benefit of incorporating a JV company is that foreign investors
can rely on a formal internal governance system to manage their cooperation
with their local partners. Risks and duties can be fairly distributed and
governed by rules decided on in advance rather than ad hoc negotiations that
could be time-consuming and uncertain. Additionally, revenues can be
distributed through a shareholding structure.
The JV company form may offer foreign investors, depending on their
targeted markets, an advantage over SMFs under certain conditions, which
largely reflect the political economy of China’s bureaucratic system. The
central government tolerated, but placed severe restrictions, on SMFs, the
substitute based on contractual agreement, limiting SMFs to export-oriented
business so they would not detract from SOEs’ monopolies in domestic
markets. 66 As a result, SMFs are not a desirable option for investors
targeting the domestic market. Furthermore, financial bargaining between
the central and local governments also led to the JV company form. The JV
company is a legal, taxable entity subject to tax paid to the central
government. This allows the central government an opportunity to share in
local revenues that would otherwise be completely held by local
governments if foreign firms are registered as SMFs. To illustrate, a foreign
firm manager stated, “Even if you go to city hall and want to register as a
64

Jieh-Min Wu, Strange Bedfellows: Dynamics of Government-Business Relations between Chinese
Local Authorities and Taiwanese Investors, 6 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 319, 330 (1997).
65
For example, by 1994, around 44 percent of all FDI projects involved JV companies, accounting
for 57 percent of the total FDI inflows in Yantai, a coastal city in Shandong province. See Huang, supra
note 5, at 219.
66
. See Criminal Trial Precedent No. 26, supra note 52.
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formal company to hold assets and property, officials will discourage you
because the higher government can share in the pie if you do that.”67 Here
the bargaining between the central and local governments has determined
the form of property substitutes.
Similar to the contractual approach, foreign investors are inclined to
establish JV companies with SOEs and TVEs that have legal and secure
access to land. The cooperation, however, is legally based on SOEs’ and
TVEs’ contribution of their land use rights to JV companies as a portion of
the invested capital, with foreign investors’ contribution of cash and the rest
of the necessary resources.68 Other governmental agencies may join these
unions in various ways.69 The local People’s Liberation Army (PLA), for
instance, may send soldiers as security guards.70
D.

Choosing Between Contractual and Corporate Law Approaches

The foreign investors’ choice between contractual (i.e., SMFs) and corporate
law (i.e., JVs) approaches for securing their property rights is largely based
on a cost and benefit analysis.71 One primary benefit of the corporate law
approach is the formal internal governance system available under the
corporate law regime. Foreign investors can apply such corporate
governance regime to their property relationships and manage the
cooperation between locals and themselves. Unlike SMFs based on
contracts that cannot be enforced formally, the corporate law approach
provides a legal way to access to land, and hence, better security and
certainty. Without a functional judiciary to enforce various contracts,
foreign investors may reduce legal risks by transforming numerous deals
into internal business decisions of a JV company.72
One important advantage to the corporate law approach is the ability of
foreign investors to position themselves between the foreign and domestic
67
Interview with the deputy director of the administration department of a high-tech manufacturing
company, in Dongguan City, Guangdong Province (July 2006).
68
For a general discussion, see PITMAN B. POTTER, FOREIGN BUSINESS LAW IN CHINA: PAST
PROGRESS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 22-29 (1995).
69
Such involvement may or may not reflect the foreign investors’ preference. Nonetheless, it is
usually part of the deal reached between the investors and their local partners and the investors have to
accept such involvement.
70
Although working like ordinary employees, these soldiers are not on the payroll like their
coworkers in the companies; instead, their salaries are taken by the PLA units, while they in return get
lower but standard wages from the PLA. See Wu, supra note 64, at 333.
71
Other business consideration may be taken in account too. For instance, the location of the land to
be acquired, the tie with the local officials, the primary market of the firms’ businesses, or costs and risks to
maintain the union.
72
See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 16 (1960).
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corporate regimes through institutional arbitrage. Forming JV companies in
foreign jurisdictions (e.g., Hong Kong and Singapore) where a betterdesigned and enforced regulatory regime is available has been widely
adopted. Such international corporate structure is also associated with the
security of revenues, which are subject to China’s capital control policies
and may not be wired abroad freely or swiftly. This is especially
troublesome for revenues generated through informal property
arrangements. As such, transnational corporate structure becomes a major
solution to address concerns about the security of revenues. For example, JV
companies may be incorporated overseas, with domestic subsidiaries merely
as their contracted manufacturers holding limited assets and just enough
cash to pay local employees and purchase raw materials from their overseas
parent companies. The revenues are to be paid to overseas JVs and retained
overseas, thereby making the balance sheet of domestic subsidiaries show
low or even no income. This way the capital control is circumvented.
Nevertheless, foreign investors need to weigh the benefits against potential
disadvantages. First, because the legal tie between partners of JV companies
is closer than that of SMFs, foreign investors must be more cautious about
choosing their partners in JV companies. Specifically, because majority rule
is its norm, whenever any disagreement occurs, corporate law works against
foreign investors that are not majority shareholders. Before the minority
shareholder protection (e.g., derivative actions) sufficiently develops in
China, foreign investors run the risk of the moral hazard inherent in JVs, as
evidenced by numerous court cases involving fraudulent change of
shareholder registration records by JV partners.73 As a result, most foreign
investors prefer to cooperate with SOEs rather than TVEs, because the
former may have not only stronger market positions and political backing
but also relatively well-documented information and better corporate
governance. In this way it reduces the risk of transaction opportunism.
Furthermore, the location of unions may also reflect investors’ consideration
and preference, especially in terms of access and the security of their
properties. For instance, foreign investors may decide to set their JV
73
Alleged fraudulent change of shareholding registration record is a very common claim made by
minority shareholders in derivative action cases in China. See, e.g., Wang Na and Beijing Oriental
Yuhong Advertising Co., Ltd. v. Beijing Peng Na Television Consulting Ltd., GAO MIN ZHONG ZI NO. 837
(Beijing Sup. Ct. Oct. 22, 2008), available at http://fj.chinalawinfo.com/NewLaw2002/SLC/slc.asp?d
b=fnl&gid=117574032 (last visited 15 July 2014). Another typical type of dispute between controlling and
minority shareholders is about the actual amount of capital contribution by foreign investors to the JV in
question, which is often caused by various side arrangements between shareholders. See, e.g., Zhuang Di
et al. v. Jiao Yun Group LLC, JI MIN SI CHU ZI NO. 111 (Shandong Jinan City Interm. People’s Ct. 2002),
available at http://shlx.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/slc.asp?db=fnl&gid=117474783 (last visited
15 July 2014). For a discussion of derivation actions in China, see Clarke & Howson, supra note 54.
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companies in Beijing rather than other cities because they are in union with
central party cadres as well as those SOEs that have better connections to the
central government. In contrast, SMFs based on informal contractual
arrangements primarily exist in southern China, away from the central
monitoring.
Second, foreign investors must take into account the operating costs
of JV companies. The costs may be higher than those of SMFs because the
JV companies’ de facto rent for land is equivalent to the shares held by
Chinese partners, usually fifty percent. It would be more expensive to pay
rent on land according to the fixed ratio of revenues than to pay a fixed
amount. Not surprisingly, there is always a dual contractual arrangement
within JV companies: one contract for official documentation, the other for
internal revenue distribution. However, this creates a moral hazard similar
to that of the informal contract approach and also poses the risk of
exploitation, especially before a long-term interdependent relationship has
taken hold.74
In comparison, the local governments’ choice between contractual or
corporate law approaches depends largely on the political economy within
the bureaucratic system. If local governments are able to gain more revenue
through SMFs than through JV companies, local officials will favor SMFs,
which are fully under their control through contractual arrangements at the
local level. On the other hand, the central government is likely to extract
higher revenues by incentivizing the formation of JV companies rather than
SMFs because JVs are taxable by the higher authorities.
Consequently, foreign investors face a dilemma: the legalization of
property implies better security, yet increased monitoring and control by the
state over their property and revenues creates a danger of exploitation by the
central government. This explains why the central government is generally
supportive of the legal approach to holding property through corporate
forms. After the 1979 Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law of the
74

Due to inherent moral hazard, many reports have revealed a great deal of cases in which local
partners confiscated their foreign counterparts’ properties. As a result, since 2000 most foreign investors
have switched to a better form of corporate entity, the wholly-owned foreign enterprise (WOFE), made
available by the 1986 Law on Foreign-Invested Enterprises, most recently amended in 2000. A WOFE has
greater freedom and independence and can better protect its intellectual properties, compared to a joint
venture. In 2002, approved WOFEs accounted for 65 percent of foreign companies. Many investment and
legal consultants, as well as the U.S. Department of Commerce, suggest that foreign investors incorporate
as WOFEs rather than JV companies unless foreign investors greatly need assistance that can only be
acquired through the JV relationship. See, e.g., Straits Exchange Foundation, 16 STRAIT BUSINESS
MONTHLY 26 (1993); Straits Exchange Foundation, 74 STRAIT BUSINESS MONTHLY 33 (1998); JINGLIAN
WU, ECONOMIC REFORMS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 288-89 (2004); UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEP’T
OF COMMERCE, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA: 2011 COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE FOR U.S. COMPANIES 8
(2011), http://www.buyusainfo.net/docs/x_8054544.pdf (last visited July 15, 2014).
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PRC, the central government provided a greater variety of corporate forms
in the subsequent years.75 In particular, Beijing incentivized the adoption of
the corporate law approach by lowering the administrative costs of using
land use rights as capital for JV companies.76 Some high-ranking party
officials have claimed that the practice of “using land as capital” is one of
the two most important institutional inventions during China’s economic
transition.77
Once they decide on the approach to apply, foreign investors’ biggest
challenge in the short term is how to manage the risks resulting from the
unions created under either approach. The relaxation of defenses by the
forming unions may increase the risks of exploitation rather than
diminishing them. 78 For instance, in the case of SMFs, local officials
involved in SMFs may block foreign investors’ business by
opportunistically processing bureaucratic matters on behalf of foreign
investors. The value of land or other contributions as JV capital may also be
arbitrarily decided by local officials and enterprises due to the absence of
neutral land appraisers.79
In the long term, contrastingly, the foreign investors need to deal with
the dilemma between a stable union and the hostage effect. This is
particularly the case when foreign investors’ partners are local governments.
75
See Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures
(promulgated by the St. Council, Sep. 20, 1983, effective Sep. 20, 1983), available at http://english.m
ofcom.gov.cn/article/lawsdata/chineselaw/200301/20030100064563.shtml, at art. 47 (China).
76
For example, Beijing encouraged the establishment of JV companies through the enactment of the
Regulations for the Implementation of the Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law in 1983 and with
subsequent amendments in 1987. In 1997, the NPC further enacted the PRC Partnership Enterprise Law,
which provides a more flexible type of corporate union for foreign investors to align with domestic legal
entities that are encouraged to use land use rights as capital. This law has been further amended in August
2006 to generally grant foreign investors greater flexibility in structuring ventures in China. The Company
Law has been modified in 2006 and does not require Chinese firms to have at least two shareholders. This
former two-shareholder requirement increased foreign firms’ risk when they wanted to set a domestic
subsidiary that would be viewed as a domestic firm. Foreign firms often introduced a nominee shareholder
to comply with this requirement, which increased costs and risk. See Regulations for the Implementation
of the Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (promulgated by the St. Council, Sep. 20, 1983, effective
Sep. 20, 1983), available at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/lawsdata/chineselaw/200301/2003010006
4563.shtml (China); Law of the People’s Republic of China on Partnership Enterprises (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 23, 1997, effective Feb. 23, 1997), available at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383548.htm.
77
Straits Exchange Foundation, 27 STRAIT BUSINESS MONTHLY 19 (1994). The other vital
institutional invention is the Household Responsibility System that allowed peasants to keep their
production and hence created a great productive incentive.
78
See Kronman, supra note 39, at 23.
79
Tai-yun Wang, The Land Appraisement of Joint Venture Negotiation Between Firms Across the
Strait, 151 STRAITS BUSINESS MONTHLY 44, 45 (2004); You-Ren Yang, The Studies of Taiwanese IT
Companies' Trans-border Production Network and Local Development in China: A Comparison between
Suzhou and Dongguan 1-22 (2005) (Ph.D. dissertation, National Taiwan University) (on file with the
author).
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When investors align themselves closely with the authorities, they are likely
to form strong unions. This also means that local officials can collect
possibly incriminating information that increases their bargaining power,
especially when officials pursue one-shot gains rather than long-term
cooperation. As a result, foreign investors suffer from the hostage effect
because their investments in lands are immobile.80
In short, in addition to the viability of respective institutional
arrangements, the success of either SMFs or JV companies depends on the
bargaining power between parties in the union. As a senior manager of a
middle-size firm stated:
That firm, a large international computer manufacturing
company, has been well known for its guts to stand against the
local government. A few years ago, after having a serious
dispute with local officials, the firm just let all of its employees
have one day off. After the downtown was crowded by 30,000
laborers for only one day, the local government compromised.
Of course, we dare not to do that. 81
This statement illustrates that the bigger the firm is, the more it can
alleviate the risk of this hostage effect. For local governments, the cost of
losing the union relationship is roughly equivalent to that of losing foreign
investment. Such a structure, however, will become unstable if bargaining
power between the parties involved significantly changes. For this reason,
this article further analyzes in Part VI whether institutional substitutes can
serve as a long-term development strategy.
IV.

ALIENABILITY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN LAND

Another major function that an ideal property regime provides is
alienability of property rights. If the property owner is banned from
transferring the property when necessary, investments in the property would
be limited because the owner is not able to redeem the residual value of any
investment by selling the property to a third party. Not only do such
restrictions disincentivize the property user from improving and making
80

For instance, when foreign investors have to rely on their local partners to deal with the numerous
governmental surcharges, the record of this evasion can be used by local partners or officials who are in
disputes with investors at a later time. Foreign firms may also be threatened not to exit a specific local
jurisdictions, which may cause loss of tax revenues.
81
Interview with the deputy director of the administration department of a high-tech manufacturing
company, supra note 67.
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efficient use of the property, but they also deprive the property owners of the
freedom that they may need to sell the property. In order to examine the
substitutes about alienability, the following sections look at the ways the
non-transferrable land can be effectively transferred (Part A) and examine in
context the contractual approach (Part B) and the corporate law approach
(Part C) to alienability.
A.

How to Transfer the Non-Transferable

Restrictions on land transfer are the default and immutable rules under
socialist collective land tenure. The government, however, has relaxed such
restrictions as the reforms moved forward. In 1990, the State Council
announced rules regarding the sales of urban land use rights. In 1998, both
the Land Administration Law and the Constitution were amended to allow
the use rights for both state-owned and collective-owned lands to be
transferred according to law. Nevertheless, prevailing restrictions on
alienability still exist. From time to time, ad hoc restrictions have also been
announced as a result of policy and even political or ideological
considerations, such as those aiming to curb overheating property markets
by limiting alienability.82
How can foreign investors transfer their property interests in land,
especially those acquired through informal channels and held by substitutive
property institutions?
Foreign investors also generally apply either
contractual or corporate law approaches to fulfill their demand for
alienability. The contractual approach primarily deals with the transaction
costs caused by restrictions on alienability; in particular, how to absorb the
costs caused by such restrictions over the course of dealings. As such, the
contractual approach is passive compared to the corporate law approach.
Contrastingly, the corporate law approach aims to proactively find a way to
bypass the limits of alienability through the law of business organization.
The bottom line is that both approaches intertwine with property rules,
thereby demonstrating again the interaction and interdependence between
the rules of property, contracts, and business organizations when
establishing substitutes for property institutions.

82
For example, land use rights could be withdrawn if land developers do not start the land
development projects two years after they acquired the use rights. Although the enforcement of these
regulations is questionable, such restrictions exist and change frequently, creating uncertainty and legal
risks.
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Contractual Approach: Institutionalizing Short-Term Horizon

“After we signed the land lease with the local government, the chief party secretary,
mayor, and deputy mayor hired about 3,500 workers to construct our manufacturing plant.
Deputy mayor Yeh actually was the general manager of a local development company. It
took only 6 months to finish our plant that is 100,000 square meter big! It was
unbelievable if you did not participate in the process.”
! A senior manager of a computer monitor manufacturing company, ranked as 4th
83
in the world

From a foreign investor’s point of view, a one-party Leninist regime
that tightly controls the allocation of land use rights may reduce the
transaction cost tremendously during the investment process. While
businessmen in transitional Russia claimed that the hardest part in acquiring
land property and securing contracts was finding the right person (local
officials, rights-holders, or the mafia) to negotiate with or to bribe,84 foreign
investors in China do not face this problem and can easily find the right
persons with whom to make a deal: party secretaries or cadres at the local
level.85 Party cadres, with power of eminent domain, even approach foreign
investors first to advertise collective land still used by peasants or other local
residents. 86 Therefore, the possibility of bargaining failure due to an
excessive number of parties being involved is low.87
Party cadres heavily discount the value of land that they control due to
the party’s internal rotation and promotion system based primarily on
economic performance indicators. 88 The current value of land is much
83
Experience of Investing in China: Lite-on Technology Corporation, 71 STRAIT BUSINESS
MONTHLY 39, 40(1997).
84
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 643-44 (1998).
85
See, e.g., Cheng-chang Chiang, Political Authority and Economic Development in Rural China: A
Study of the CCP Village-Level Party Secretary, 45 MAINLAND CHINA STUDIES 19, 25(2002).
86
See interview with the general manager of a real estate and construction-consulting firm, in
Kunshan City, Jiangsu Province (June 2011); interview with the manager of a recycling service company,
in Kunshan City, Jiangsu Province (June 2011); interview with the vice president of a recreational resort, in
Songjiang District, Shanghai (May 2006).
87
In general, if the number of participants is large, the efficient adaptation of property rights
arrangements to new circumstances is more difficult because the consensus is harder to achieve. See GARY
D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 6-7 (1989).
88
CCP’s cadre responsibility system has been effective since 1988. The principal criteria of
evaluation are formulated in very general terms, including work achievement, political integrity,
competence, diligence, and achievements, with an emphasis on actual work achievements. Work
achievement usually accounts for 60 to 70 percent of the evaluation. See PIERRE LANDRY, DECENTRALIZED
AUTHORITARIANISM IN CHINA: THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S CONTROL OF LOCAL ELITES IN THE POST-MAO
ERA (2008); Maria Edin, State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from
a Township Perspective, 173 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 35, 36-37 (2003).
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higher to them than it will be in the future because they lose power over the
land after leaving their current post.89 Thus, they have both fiscal and
political incentives to cooperate with foreign investors pursuing economic
gains through land property rights arrangements. Ultimately, strategic
bargaining is attenuated and agreements are easily formed.
Long-term cooperation, however, may relieve foreign investors of
concerns about security but not those about transferability because land
transfers suspend such union and cooperation. Local governments, for
example, may pressure investors not to exit the local market, or conversely
may require them to assign the lease to designated firms that have offered a
higher price for their lands and promised higher revenue contributions. As a
result, foreign investors often end up with sales made at a huge discount due
either to time or to political pressure.90 Therefore, under the contractual
approach, rather than thinking of the transfer per se, foreign investors focus
on the means to absorb the costs and risks caused by restrictions on
alienability.
Foreign investors manage such risks largely by changing their
business behaviors. To begin with, foreign investors may shorten their
payback periods in the face of long-term risks. Land developers, for
instance, try to finish construction within six months of acquiring the land
and construction permits and try to finish the transactions as quickly as
possible.91 Land developers may prefer to construct mansions rather than
condominiums for the general public because the former involves fewer
transactions, albeit a better profit may be earned through condominium
projects because they have much more units to sell.92

89
Studies also show that, in some cases, highly successful rural industrialization may make
promotion less attractive to village leaders, who are less integrated into the state system and receive no
fixed salary from the state, as their counterparts in the higher township level do. With their more
independent status and resulting greater discretionary control over TVEs, they can gain more through the
status quo than through pursuing promotion from the lowest bottom of the party/state system. Nevertheless,
their motivation is based on greater opportunities of rent seeking, which makes them indifferent from those
who pursue promotion by abusing collective land. See Susan Whiting, The Micro-Foundations of
Institutional Change in Reform China: Property Rights and Revenue Extraction in the Rural Industrial
Sector, at 275-76 (1995) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan); Scott Rozelle, Decision-Making in
China’s Rural Economy: The Linkages between Village Leaders and Farm Households, 137 CHINA
QUARTERLY 115 (1994).
90
Tung-pi Chen, How to Suspend the Investment in the Mainland, 72 STRAIT BUSINESS MONTHLY
44, 46-47 (1997).
91
Interview with the vice president of a land development firm in Shanghai, in Songjiang District,
Shanghai (June 2006); interview with a former PRC governmental official, in New Haven, Connecticut,
United States (December 2006); interview with the general manager of a manufacturing company, in Taipei,
Taiwan (July 2010).
92
See interviews cited supra note 91.
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Furthermore, investors tend to exploit land to achieve a quicker return.
Manufacturing firms, for instance, try to facilitate the investment payback by
acquiring as much land as possible. By doing so, they can construct basic
but massive factories and start to manufacture products as soon as possible.
Although a variety of payback periods may exist, many firms set them for
two to three years; five years at most. Achieving their goals, the firms do
not worry that the government may take their land back. In-house legal
counsel for high-tech companies with high margins have revealed that land
is not even viewed as an asset but as part of their business cost on their
balance sheets.93 This is because they assume they will not be holding the
rights to their land for long when they calculate the cost-benefits of their
investment plans.
Ironically, some investors consider the seizure of land by the state,
usually controversial, to be the last resort for dealing with the inalienability.
To illustrate, the founder of a manufacturing firm stated:
I plan to retire soon, but my son is working as a software
programmer in the US and has no interest in taking over our
business in China. If I manage to persuade the government to
exercise the power of eminent domain and take my lands by
providing compensation, that will be my best exit strategy.94
Given the prominent short-term mentality and short payback period, it
is not uncommon for both the investors and the local government to
welcome the exercise of eminent domain, which is functionally similar to
the buyback option in a contractual context.
C.

Corporate Law Approach: The Case of the Project Company

“I went to the local office of the land bureau to ask how to buy a parcel of land that we
had been trying to buy from a division of the military. An official asked if I had
registered a ‘project company.’ I had no idea about what the ‘project company’ was and
wondered why I had to have one to buy land.”
! A land investor taking about his first land buying experience in China95
93

See interview with the in-house lawyer of an international computer manufacturing company, in
Taipei, Taiwan (May 2008); interview with the deputy director of the administration department of a
leading high-tech manufacturing company, in Dongguan City, Guangdong Province (July 2006).
94
Interview with the president of a Taiwanese Merchant Association, in Taipei, Taiwan (February
2014).
95
Interview with a Taiwanese real estate investor, in Shanghai (May 2006).
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In theory, one who intends to participate in the land development
industry in China should incorporate a real estate development company,
the official type of corporation adopted for land development. A
complicated governance structure for real estate development companies has
been established by the central government.96 In practice, however, land
investors, foreign investors included, have commonly applied the corporate
law approach to execute land transactions for the sake of alienability—that
is, the project company.97
The rationale for using the project company reflects a natural
lawyering instinct: if land cannot be transferred, then transfer the shares of
the company that owns the land.98 A project company merely owns a single
parcel of land and exists until its land development project is completed,
because it is created solely for the development of already-acquired land and
subsequent land transfer. In contrast, a real estate development company,
like any normal company, can develop multiple projects and continue as
long as the law permits.
Transferring land through share transactions is done to circumvent
various restrictions imposed on land alienability. For example, owners are
not allowed to transfer lands unless they have completed at least 25% of
their land development plans.99 Also, if lands have been obtained through
illegal means, investors may have a hard time transferring the lands in
question, such as those rural lands that have been illegally transferred for
non-agricultural use. In reality, however, such restrictions on alienability
have been bypassed and illegal transfer of land is prominent across China.
A 2010 official investigation indicated that such illegally transferred lands
composed 57.49% of the total number of buildings in Shenzhen, the major
commercial hub in the north of Hong Kong.100 Isn’t the illegal transfer
96
In addition to the regular procedure of company incorporation, a substantial review of the
qualifications of applicants as real estate developers is required. See NEI-WEN CHANG, THE OPERATION OF
REAL ESTATE BUSINESS IN MAINLAND CHINA 103-05 (2003).
97
The project company is incorporated in the form of a limited liability company under the
Company Law.
98
Transferring shares is defined as either share transfer within the project company, or share swap
between the project company and a purchasing company in the case of merger and acquisition. Players will
choose different types of share transfer in different contexts. In general, share transfer within the project
company is easy and efficient. If the buyer has had a company or plans to register another company eligible
for more governmental subsidies, such as tax exemptions provided for certain types of foreign companies,
share swap may be preferred.
99
Another restriction is that foreign investors are forbidden to participate in the real estate industry
without permission from the authorities. See Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Law on Wholly
Foreign-Owned Enterprises (promulgated by the St. Council, Oct. 28, 1990, effective Dec. 12, 1990),
available at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/lawsdata/chineselaw/200301/20030100062868.html at
art. 5 (China).
100
Qiao, supra note 4, at 11.
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through shares of project companies risky? “Not at all, and everyone does
this” is probably the standard answer one will get from locals.101
In fact, local governments have also supported the corporate law
approach and even required the adoption of the project company, as shown
in the interview excerpt in the beginning of this section. Local officials have
encouraged the adoption of the project company by not applying property
income tax to the de facto transfer of land that usually creates enormous
returns. The primary reason lies in the low regulatory costs when local lands
are regulated through project companies. Unlike the normal real estate
company, one project company represents one parcel of land, and hence the
boundaries of property rights are clear even if the land is subsequently
transferred to a third party through the company’s share transfer. Based on
clearly defined property units, local governments can govern and extract
rents (e.g., by taxation) efficiently.
Transferring land through shares in fact depicts a process of
securitization of property rights. One negative consequence of securitization
is fragmentation of rights that would make land use inefficient. The next
section explains this dynamic securitization process in detail and analyzes
how the corporate law approach addresses such concerns.
1.

Informal Securitization of Property Rights

The nature of the project company, as an intermediate form of land
ownership, is an informal securitization of the property rights in land.102 The
essence of securitization is to convert illiquid assets into liquid assets,
thereby transferring securities to serve certain purposes such as obtaining
financing.103 Similarly, the purpose of the project company is to convert

101

Qiao applies the game theory to explain why Shenzhen government has rationally chose not to
enforce its outdated land laws and why not such poor enforcement has affected the credibility of the
Shenzhen government. Id. at 22-24.
102
The project company is similar to the condominium associations and housing cooperatives that
allocate housing units to their members and shareholders in the sense that the transfer of property rights is
conducted in the form of a share transfer. A housing cooperative is usually a corporation that owns real
estate such as one or more residential buildings. Each shareholder in the legal entity is granted the right to
occupy one housing unit, which is similar to a lease.
103
By definition, asset securitization is the structured process whereby interests in loans and other
receivables are packaged, underwritten, and sold in the form of “asset-backed” securities into an open
market. See Lowell L. Bryan, Introduction, in THE ASSET SECURITIZATION HANDBOOK 3-5 (Phillip L.
Zweig ed., 1989); see generally OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ASSET SECURITIZATION
COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK (1997).
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land ownership into company shares in order to obtain the alienability of
land under a rigid state-owned land tenure regime.104
Identical to the establishment of a project company, the first phase of
a regular securitization process is to establish a company as the special
purpose vehicle (SPV) that solely holds the properties to securitize. While
the SPV is structured to avoid potential legal risks such as those posed by
bankruptcy law,105 the project company runs as a vehicle for bypassing
restrictions and risks posed by the regulations of China’s land regime.
The project company, however, differs from a regular securitization in
the second half of the process because of the distinctive objectives of
respective vehicles. While the SPV goes through a legally complex process
to sell investors its securities in an open market, the project company simply
sells investors its shares through close-knit networks. The owners of the
SPV aim to obtain low-cost and long-term financing through an open market
selling; 106 the owners of the project company aim to reap their land
investment quickly through a whole sale of shares.
Furthermore, the project company has even lower transaction costs
compared to the SPV. A normal securitization in a mature market usually
incurs high compliance costs due to sophisticated tax and accounting rules
and the like; how to reduce these costs for the SPV, a one-shot corporate
structure, is a major task.107 In contrast, the transaction costs for establishing
and maintaining a project company are not a concern given the support of
local governments, an easy registration process, and simple corporate
governance.
2.

Anticommons and Project Companies

Prior to the 1979 open door policy, China’s land system could be
defined as a common property regime where no one had exclusive rights of
use.
After 1979, however, when decentralization was carried out,
anticommons were created when the central government decentralized
property rights without clearly defining the owners of land use rights. As a
result, different levels of local governments and multiple owners (such as
SOEs, TVEs, PLA, and various work units (danwei)) may hold rights of
104
The securitization is usually associated with land because land is valuable and the rent is easily
collected. The securitization of mortgage-backed loans is a case in point. In fact, the origin of securitization
is related to land, which is valuable but immovable and illiquid. See Friedman, supra note 35, at 246-47.
105
See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 13536 (1994); Bryan, supra note 103, at 14.
106
See Schwarcz, supra note 105, at 135.
107
See id. at 138-41.
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exclusion to the same piece of land.108 The consequence of anticommons is
usually underuse of properties due to multiple parties holding exclusionary
rights, as seen during the economic transition in Russia.109
In theory, informal securitization separating land property rights into
multiple property rights fragments would jeopardize the potential problems
of anticommons because more owners would exist after the securitization.
Bargaining failure for efficient land use would also occur if too many rights
holders were involved, with resources then becoming prone to waste.110
This is what property rights literature labels as the “tragedy of
anticommons.”111
In reality, however, the use of the corporate law regime as a substitute
for property transfer does not lead to the problems of fragmentation and
underuse of land because the project company actually only fragments land
temporarily. To reap the benefits of rent-seeking, shareowners have a great
incentive to exit the project company by selling their shares wholesale. The
value of the shares of project companies lies not solely in the value of lands,
but also in the transferability of land with which owners can redeem that
value. In practice, subsequent buyers will require sellers to ensure that the
shares/lands are easy to transfer afterwards. Therefore, sellers have to
aggregate the outstanding shares, and, in most cases, sell all shares to one
single buyer. This internal governance mechanism guarantees that the
fragments of ownership will be recombined before they are transferred to the
next buyer.
The project company nonetheless contributes to the high frequency of
land transfers and the soaring property prices in China. It creates a fast
channel for land speculators, who usually acquire lands from the government
at a cost lower than the market price, to cash out the value of lands by
simply transferring them without any development. Other side effects
include problems of corruption and land grabs. One study shows that lands
are commonly transferred four to five times before actual development
starts.112 Each subsequent transferee has to cover the rising costs by raising
the price for the next deal. In suburban areas, underuse still happens, but not
108

See, e.g., You-tien Hsing, Land and Territorial Politics in Urban China, 187 THE CHINA Q. 575

(2006).

109

See Heller, supra note 84, at 643-44.
To prevent these problems, multiple mechanisms can be adopted, including: preventing and
abolishing fragments; indirectly imposing costs on ownership such as property tax and registration fees that
deter fragmentation; and informally, through non-legal institutions and social norms that replace formal
boundary rules. See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L. J. 1166, 1166,
1169, 1173 (1999).
111
Heller, supra note 84.
112
See QING-LIAN HE, CHINA’S DESCENT INTO A QUAGMIRE 43–44 (2003).
110
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because of anticommons; it results from rent-seeking and overdevelopment
causing what the locals call “ghost towns.”113
D.

Choosing Between Contractual and Corporate Law Approaches

The contractual approach primarily deals with the transaction costs
caused by restrictions on alienability, while the corporate law approach takes
advantage of the law of business organizations to circumvent various
restrictions. The former is more reactive than the latter, which is proactive
but also more complicated.
The choice between the two approaches depends largely on the nature
of one’s business and the arrangements of the lands before foreign investors
acquire them. If foreign investors do not count on land transfer as their
source of revenue, it is easier and less risky to stay put rather than
incorporate a company to hold lands in order to sell them illegally through
share transfer at a later date. In this case, the contractual approach may be
preferred. Accordingly, the investors may adjust their business behaviors to
manage the risks and costs caused by the restrictions on alienability, such as
shortening the investment payback period or even engaging in an
exploitative manner towards land use. In contrast, if the predecessors
initially acquired the lands in question through shareholding, foreign
investors will likely just follow suit by adopting the corporate law approach.
This is not uncommon because numerous governmental agencies have also
used the project company as a vehicle to transfer land under their control
through share swap among them (e.g., an eastern province can exchange
their lands with a western province through such swaps).114 When such
lands are to be transferred in the secondary market, share transfer is the
default method to transfer the lands.
The corporate law approach is particularly beneficial for the formation
of a union involving multiple parties. The first reason is that the project
company is easy to join and exit by transfer of shares. Second, by
piggybacking on a corporate regime, partners can also allocate revenues in
proportion to respective shareholding. This is a simple way to govern their
113
, China Builds Its Own Manhattan—Except It's a Ghost Town, BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 27, 2014,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-26/china-s-manhattan-project-marred-by-ghost-buildings.html
(last visited Oct. 5, 2014); Robin Banerji & Patrick Jackson, China's Ghost Towns and Phantom Malls,
BBC NEWS, Aug. 13, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-19049254 (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).
114
See interview with the vice president of the legal department of a land development firm, in
Changning District, Shanghai (June 2006); interview with the president of a real estate group, in Changning
District, Shanghai (June 2006); interview with a real estate investor, in Shanghai (May 2006); interview
with the outside legal counsel of a real estate company, in Huangpu District, Shanghai (June 2009).
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internal relationship, which is all about revenue sharing. Third, the company
can bypass a land registration process under a normal property transfer
procedure, which usually requires governmental approvals. This is not ideal
for illegal or non-registrable titles or for partners that are legally entitled to
own the lands in question (such as corrupt officials or unqualified foreign
owners). Lastly, restrictions on alienability can be circumvented.
Nevertheless, the downside of applying the corporate law approach
for land transfer is twofold. First, similar to its moral hazard problem in the
context of JVs,115 the corporate law approach may subject foreign investors
to potential abuse by majority shareholders. The default majority rule of the
company law may work against subsequent shareholders/investors who are
not majority shareholders. Many disputes are caused by the ambiguity of
shareholder status due to various side arrangements. 116 Second, various
parties cannot benefit from property law, which provides default rules to
allocate the risks of property transactions among the seller, buyer, and third
party. Under the corporate law approach, risks may result from the lack of
accurate information about the company’s financial status, potential liability,
unwritten contractual obligation, undisclosed share pledges, mortgage or
guarantee. Buyers can only acquire necessary information through personal
networks. To illustrate, an experienced businessman advising a new
investor considering the purchase of a PLA-owned project company stated,
“Give me the name of the owner and that company. I can ask my friend in
the Public Security Bureau to investigate his reputation and financial
status.”117 In contrast, the formal property registration system provides a
better disclosure and notice mechanism, thereby vesting land purchasers
with property rights that are in principle enforceable against third parties.
It is interesting to note the attitude of district governments toward land
transfers through project companies: governments are very supportive of
such transactions due to fiscal considerations. As each project company
registered within its jurisdiction represents one clear taxable target, the local
government can collect rents from development projects with lower
enforcement costs. A county government, for instance, will not allow a
project company registered in another county to conduct land development
within its jurisdiction because the county cannot tax that project company.
Rather, the county would require the developer to register a project company
within its jurisdiction. In contrast, a real estate company can manage interregional land business and thus is subject to various regulations set by the
115
116
117

See discussion supra Part III.D.
See supra note 73and accompanying text.
Interview with the vice president of a recreational resort in Shanghai, supra note 86.
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central government.118 As a result, the form of real estate companies not
only limits the company’s business flexibility but also constrains the local
government’s monopoly of tax revenues generated therein.
Although both contractual and corporate law approaches can facilitate
the land transfers and manage the transaction costs caused by restrictions on
alienability, they are far from the perfect options that property law normally
provides. Benefits and burdens in land may not be fully disclosed due to the
absence of registration, and competing interests cannot be efficiently
prioritized according to normal property rules. The alternative approaches to
transferring land also require supplementation by the practice of kinship
networks and hence remain subject to geographic limits. Investors who are
out the loop, for example, would face uncontrollable risks and may hesitate
to engage in land transfers arranged by the corporate law approach.
V.

PROPERTY RIGHTS DISPUTE RESOLUTION

“After I started practicing law here, I was surprised by the important role of contracts in
Shanghai’s business world. Contrary to my understanding of Chinese culture, people do
not seem to trust each other and therefore rely heavily on written contracts. If you don’t
write down your counterparty’s promise, do not expect him to carry it out.”
! A Taiwanese Attorney in Shanghai119

The increase in the use of contracts may help reduce disputes,
provided parties are willing to comply with the agreements. On the other
hand, it also indicates an increase in distrust between business actors that
may lead to failures in contract enforcement, especially in cases of
incomplete contracts.120 In a 2006 survey about Taiwanese businessmen’s
everyday obstacles, 40.7% of the interviewees point to the “counterparty’s

118

See the Law of the People's Republic of China on Urban Real Estate Administration (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Jul. 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995), available at
http://faolex.fao.org/cgibin/faolex.exe?database=faolex&search_type=query&table=result&query=ID:LEX
-FAOC012082&format_name=ERALL&lang=eng.
119
Interview with a Taiwanese attorney based in Shanghai, in Changning District, Shanghai (June
2006).
120
See interview with the general manager of an American firm, in Caohejing Hi-tech Park, Shanghai
(June, 2013); interview with the managing partner of a law firm that has a presence in Beijing and Shanghai,
in Taipei, Taiwan (June 2013). See also JAMES MCGREGOR, ONE BILLION CUSTOMERS: LESSONS FROM THE
FRONT LINES OF DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 274-75 (2005) (providing a similar observation about the
increasing distrust between people in China’s business world); Stanley Lubman, Looking for Law in China,
20 COLUM. J. OF ASIAN L. 1, 80-81 (2006) (contending that a value crisis has occurred in China where older
traditions have been eroded and the Communist ideology itself has increasingly lost its coherence).
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unwillingness to carry out contractual obligations” as a major problem.121
Such is also the case with land disputes, which account for one of their
major investments.122
When disputes arise, court has never been a top option. Instead,
mediation and arbitration are the two preferred approaches. This preference
results from a number of well-recognized problems with Chinese courts,
including corruption, local protectionism, and lack of judicial
independence. 123 Shareholder protection mechanisms (e.g., derivative
lawsuits), vital for addressing the moral hazard problem inherent in the
corporate law approach, have been successfully implemented but remain
insufficient to resolve disputes. 124
Sometimes, however, judicial
proceedings play an unconventional role in the union between foreign
investors and their local partners. For instance, foreign investors and local
officials may use courts to fulfill various bureaucratic requirements for
formality, such as for writing off debts or providing compensation for which
a court decision is needed. “In fact, we sued local government divisions
because local officials working there asked us to sue for the sake of
formality,” said an investor with experience suing governments.125 Similarly,
SOEs usually file their cases in court merely to collect verdicts in order to
write off their non-performing loans.126
Foreign investors widely use private extrajudicial mediation through
various networks rather than judicial mediation or the people’s mediation
committee system. The foregoing 2006 survey indicates that 53.8% of
interviewees viewed such mediation as the most effective way to resolve
disputes.127 Furthermore, 27% of interviewees further revealed that they
121
2006 Survey of Taiwanese Merchants in China, CHINESE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDUSTRY
(2007), http://www.cnfi.org.tw/kmportal/front/bin/ptdetail.phtml?Part=magazine9602-443-02 (last visited
July 15, 2014) [hereinafter CNFI].
122
Id.
123
See, e.g, Randall Peerenboom, Judicial Independence in China: Common Myths and Unfounded
Assumptions, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION
(Randall Peerenboom ed., 2009); Xin He, A Tale of Two Chinese Courts: Economic Development and
Contract Enforcement, 39 J L & SOC’Y 384, 394-400 (2012); DANIEL C.K. CHOW & ANNA M. HAN, DOING
BUSINESS IN CHINA: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 524-25 (2012).
124
Clarke & Howson, supra note 49.
125
See interviews cited supra note 38.
126
Yingmao Tang, Social Transition, Evolving State-Owned Enterprises and Judicial Institutions in
China: A Theory of Legal Institutions in Development 75-77 (2004) (J.S.D. dissertation, Yale Law School)
(on file with Yale University Library).
127
CNFI, supra note 122. This finding also echoes with the outcome of similar surveys regarding
dispute resolutions adopted by firms in China during the same period. In a study of firms in Shanghai and
Nanjing, 92.8 percent of firms typically relied on direct negotiation to resolve disputes. In a World Bank
survey, 87.1 percent of firms used negotiation in the final resolution of disputes with at least one client,
while 93.2 percent used negotiation with at least one supplier. Donald Clarke et al., Law, Institutions, and
Property Rights in China, 129 ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT 42, 46 (July 2005).
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used Taiwanese Merchants Associations (TMAs) as mediators to resolve
disputes. 128 As a matter of fact, this article argues that TMAs are
organizations that have institutionalized both the contract and corporate law
approaches for establishing substitutive property institutions. This Part first
focuses on the risks underlying the relevant disputes and then on the role of
TMAs in dispute resolution.
A.

Managing the Disputes That Cannot Be Won

The best way of resolving disputes is to prevent the opportunism and
conflicts of interest that breed and fuel the disputes. Both the contractual
and corporate law approaches generally engage this method of preventing
underlying conflicts. However, without protection by property law, disputes
arise not only from the failure to enforce incomplete contracts, but also from
the limitations of contractual rights in the face of third parties with
competing claims. Investors must apply diverse approaches to enforcing
various agreements and preventing disputes.
Foreign investors heavily rely on the second-party mechanism to
prevent and solve disputes. Reputation mechanism plays a crucial role. If
the promisor breaks the relationship by pursuing a one-shot increase in
profit, the promisee can punish him by making him lose future business
opportunities.129 In a study of firms in Shanghai and Nanjing, 74.2% of the
surveyed firms said that other businesses would hear about any disputes that
arose between the firm and one of its suppliers.130 This may jeopardize the
future business opportunity of the defaulting party. A senior manager of a
recycling service company also revealed the practice of reputation
mechanism:
We don’t do business with strangers, only with clients
recommended by our friends. We trust them as long as they are
introduced by friends. We communicate candidly. For
instance, some let us know who their concurrent partners were,
or which party secretary had also introduced them to other
service providers whom they were not supposed to reject. They
128

CNFI, supra note 122.
See Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 616-17 (1981); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 137-47 (1991).
130
Clarke et al., supra note 127, at 46. See also Donald Clarke et al., The Role of Law in China's
Economic Development, in CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION (Loren Brandt & Thomas G.
Rawski eds., 2008).
129
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could switch to us if we help them get away from those
people.131
To engage in the similar second-party mechanism, the corporate law
approach depends on direct participants in the firm (e.g., shareholders and
mangers) rather than indirect participants (e.g., accountants, judges and
lawyers) to self-enforce its governance regime.132 For example, shareholders
in a JV company that recognize the merit of long-term cooperation will
bring reciprocity of trust and honesty into the exchange process. If foreign
investors with key managerial expertise exit before the end of the payback
period, local partners will likely lose their initial investment. Additionally,
the resulting increase in unemployment, which could cause social unease,
will also concern local officials.133
This reputation mechanism for self-enforcement applies to the
cooperation between foreign investors and local officials too. It is not
uncommon for a local official to refuse to comply with a contract between
his predecessor and foreign investors, sometimes for legitimate reasons such
as the illegality of such contracts. If such contract repudiation happens, the
reputation of related local officials or information about the business
environment in that region as a whole spread quickly, especially through
trade associations discussed later in this section.
The object of contracts also matters for the enforcement: the more
irreplaceable it is, the more likely the enforcement can be maintained. 134
One key objective of unions between local officials and foreign investors is
regulatory power (e.g., secure access to land and alienability guaranteed by
the authority) that is exchanged for tax revenues. In underdeveloped
regions, this exchange is unlikely to be replaceable, whereas it becomes
more replaceable in an urban area where late-arriving investors may
incentivize the locals to deliberately breach contracts by promising them
higher revenue contribution. In such an event, the contacts in question
become vulnerable under increasing pressure to be replaced.
131
Interview with the manager of an electronics recycling company, in Dongguan City, Guangdong
Province (June 2006).
132
Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1911, 1916 (1996).
133
It is not unusual that a single foreign company contributes more than half of the annual tax
revenue that a town or county government collects. Chih-Jou J. Chen, The Role of Taiwanese Businessmen
in The Cross-Strait Political and Economic Interaction 58-59 (Research Report of Mainland Affairs
Council of Taiwan (ROC), 2001).
134
Simon Johnson et al., Contract Enforcement in Transition (CESifo, Working Paper Series, Nov.
1999).
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Moreover, business behaviors may be adjusted according to perceived
risks. For example, Taiwanese investors are more willing to give trade
credit to their fellow investors and increase credit after long-term
cooperation, but they give little or even no credit line to their local trade
partners.135 Some firms also prefer cash transactions when doing business
with local firms so they can have a shorter payback period and a better exit
strategy. Such practices indicate that norms beneficial for a group’s insiders
may have different effects on outsiders of this group, and therefore the
methods for resolving disputes may vary accordingly.136
After all, it is impossible to eliminate the risk of disputes entirely, and
investors’ mindsets and biases also enhance their willingness to bear risks,
particularly in China. To begin with, a long-lasting economic upturn has
given rise to a lower expectation of risk, and this optimistic bias results in
systematic overconfidence in risk judgments. Additionally, a short-term
mentality makes investors less worried about risk unless the risk is in the
foreseeable future.137 It is common for foreign investors in China not to
worry about the security of properties resting on a time-limited or legallyproblematic land lease rather than a legally-binding permanent property title.
This mentality in turn gives rise to a status quo bias that tends to desensitize
investors to risk. Over time, foreign investors come to feel relatively secure
about their unlawful land use after realizing that many other investors share
the same illegal status and learning of the government’s difficulties in
carrying out stringent law enforcement.138 As a result, further institutional
arrangements are needed to deal with these residual risks, and hence the
trade associations are used by foreign investors as a means of collective
action in response to such risks.

135

See, e.g., You-Tien Hsing, MAKING CAPITALISM IN CHINA: THE TAIWAN CONNECTION 75-76

(1998).
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Robert Ellickson, The Twilight of Critical Theory: A Reply to Litowitz, 15 YALE J. L. & HUMAN.
333, 334-35 (2003).
137
Even worse, the author was often told that some career employees may only focus on the risk that
may materialize within their short stays in China.
138
This is also related to a mentality of availability heuristics. People base their prediction of the
frequency of an event or the degree of risk on how easily an example can be brought to mind. When foreign
investors learn about numerous other investors that share similar status with them and have not been
confronted with serious problems, they tend to ignore risk. Many of my interviewees have mentioned that
they used to be concerned with the time limit of their land use rights and some illegal land arrangements
with towns and villages, but not anymore. See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 4, 9 (Cass Sunstein ed.,
2000).
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Trade Associations

“If they [local party cadres] cannot help to solve my problems beyond their jurisdiction,
they would introduce me to their friends that have jurisdiction over the issues. This is
extremely important for us, given the huge market in China.”
— A senior manager of a Taiwanese firm based in Shanghai139

One shared feature of substitutive legal institutions is the limited
geographic or social scope in which they can be effective. For example,
foreign investors based in Shanghai may have difficulty finding new
trustworthy partners in Beijing to create a union. Residual risks that neither
contractual nor corporate law approaches are able to fully cope with would
fail a self-enforcing mechanism. In response, a more collective and
organized approach is needed as a supplementary mechanism—the trade
association.
The trade association has roots in Chinese business society, and now
plays the further role of unifying foreign investors and local regulators’
interests to the extent that dispute resolutions can be facilitated.140 Foreign
investors, ethnically Chinese or not, have various options for trade
associations, such as the Association of Enterprises with Foreign Investment
(AEFI), a nationwide network sponsored by the government.141 This Part B
focuses on the TMAs catering to the Taiwanese foreign investors across
China.
The role of TMAs is to institutionalize contractual and corporate law
approaches by engaging in collective means to optimize outcomes. TMAs
help transcend geographic limitations and improve foreign investors’
bargaining powers. Both the foreign investors and the governments also use
TMAs as a platform to legalize and institutionalize their collaboration.
1.

Preventing Disputes by Transcending Geographic and Social Network
Limitations

Given strong local protectionism and dense local networks, individual
foreign investors have difficulty breaking into a new regional market. To
139

Interview with the manager of an electronics recycling company, supra note 131.
During the late Qing dynasty and subsequent Republican period, guilds for merchants and
tradesmen and organizations for immigrants and sojourners from the same place of origin (tongxianghui)
were prevalent. See, e.g., BRUCE J. DICKSON, RED CAPITALISTS IN CHINA: THE PARTY, PRIVATE
ENTREPRENEURS, AND PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL CHANGE 16-17 (2003).
141
Unlike TMAs, AEFIs are established in line with a bureaucratic system. Shanghai City, for
instance, has Shanghai AEFI, while Fengxian, a county of Shanghai City, has Fengxian AEFI.
140
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cope with the limited scope in which substitutes can be effective, TMAs
make themselves a broad networking and information exchange mechanism.
Mainly established in the mid-1990s, TMAs are loosely unified associations
in major industrial cities across China. As such, TMAs turn out to be a
crucial mechanism for Taiwanese investors to transcend geographic
limitations.
TMAs greatly supplement both contractual and corporate law
approaches and prevent disputes because information about remote markets
and local partners’ reputations can be efficiently circulated among foreign
investors. In forming informal property relationships with local partners, for
example, most investors are concerned with the issue of hold-up. If one or
two shareholders refuse to transfer their shares of the project company
holding the land, the tragedy of anticommons will occur due to the exercise
of widely dispersed veto power. Land transfer by the corporate law
approach will fail if such a hold-up happens, because potential buyers are
unlikely willing to purchase incomplete property rights in the form of shares.
Consequently, hold-up impedes the efficient use of land. As such, finding a
reliable transaction party in new markets, potentially through TMAs, is
crucial for successful business expansion.
2.

Resolving Disputes by Facilitating Mediations and Collective
Bargaining

TMAs also play the role of a mediation institution outside the official
mediation system, and recent surveys show that the majority of Taiwanese
firms across regions and industries have ranked TMAs as their top choice for
resolving disputes.142 Most importantly, different TMAs share networks
with each other, thereby facilitating mediation by bringing in resources
relevant to the mediation process and penetrating local protectionism.
TMAs themselves could also be a stakeholder in mediation because
efficiently preventing or resolving disputes increases their value as a trade
association. For instance, TMAs frequently organize group visits to other
regional markets that their members are not familiar with in order to help
transcend the limitations of geographic scope. To reduce risk of negotiating
with local developers individually, TMAs may, on behalf of their members,
negotiate collectively with local governments or special economic zones

142
YUAN-HSIANG CHEN ET AL., STUDIES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTIONS BY TAIWANESE INVESTORS IN
CHINA 137-141 (National Taipei University Asian Studies Center ed., 2011).
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about the price of land.143 In such cases, TMAs have a strong incentive to
help resolve subsequent disputes, thus maintaining their own reputation as
an institution worth joining.
3.

Privatizing Regulatory Powers and Institutionalizing Substitutive
Institutions

Like other substitutive property institutions, TMAs receive support
from the Chinese government, which relies on workable substitutes to
compensate for its current institutional deficits. This has helped TMAs
formalize and institutionalize the contractual and corporate law approaches
to creating property substitutes.
First of all, local governments have privatized their authority to TMAs
and delegated to trade associations the authority to officially issue
governmental notices in the form of so-called “red-letterhead documents.”
This practice facilitates business-related administrative procedures and
resolves disputes with governmental agencies. This form of governmental
notice is often used by local officials for issuing instructions about specific
cases, executive guidelines for policy implementation, or more general rules
and ordinances. 144 Local governments sometimes even use such notice to
nullify existing land leases in order to re-allocate land.145 A folk saying
143

For instance, to reduce the risk of buying land individually, Shanghai Taiwan Merchant
Association gathered more than 200 merchants to a new developing area named Nan-tong, where the price
of land is less than one-quarter of the Shanghai suburbs. They negotiated with local officials in a collective
way. See Dao-Cheng Lee, Reducing the Cost of Buying Land for the Members of Taiwan Merchant
Association, INDUSTRY AND BUSINESS TIMES, May 5, 2006, at A7; Collective Action is the Power,
INDUSTRY AND BUSINESS TIMES, Mar. 25, 2006, at A7.
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/news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-12/19/content_5506196.htm (last visited July 15, 2014); Citizens Have
the Rights to Challenge Contradictory Red-letterhead Documents, PEOPLE’S DAILY, Nov. 23, 2005,
available at http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/politics/200511/23/content_3821668.htm (last visited July 15, 2014).
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These administrative notices indeed have great influence on matters beyond the bureaucracy since
they can be used to set the principles for policy decisions. See Qinfen Wen, The Scope and Definition of
“Law” in the Concept of Rule of Law: A Normative Perspective and A Pragmatic Perspective, 9 SOC. SCI.
IN NANJING 62, 66 (2001) (in Chinese); Qinye Shi, A Review on the Authority and Effectiveness of Redletterhead Documents, 4 SECRETARY’S COMPANION 5, 5-6 (2006) [in Chinese]; How Could Red-letterhead
Documents Intervene and Change Land Leases? XINGHUA VIEWPOINT, Jan 31, 2007,
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illustrates the power of such administrative notice: “Black letterhead (formal
laws and statues) are inferior to the red letterhead; however, the red
letterhead is inferior to white letterhead (officials’ private instructions on a
piece of paper).”146 Although non-governmental organizations, TMAs have
nevertheless been granted authority with respect to matters that do not have
a direct effect on the general public.147 Consequently, members of TMAs
can reach local governmental agencies directly and efficiently, while nonmembers or ordinary people can only air their grievances through external,
formal channels.
Moreover, local officials have participated in TMAs’ management
directly and thus converted TMAs from non-governmental organizations to
government-linked organizations or government-operated non-governmental
organizations (GONGOs). It has become standard practice for local
governments to assign a senior official to serve as the executive secretary
general of a TMA. Other positions such as advisors and honorific presidents
are likewise served by a variety of local officials, including senior officials
or heads of the Labor Bureau, the Post and Telecom Bureau, the Armed
Police Bureau, the Public Security Bureau, the Customs Office, the
Economic and Trade Commission, or the Taiwan Affairs Office at the local
level.148 This way, local officials and foreign investors can formalize their
networks in a way similar to the corporate law approach. To illustrate how
TMAs facilitate and institutionalize personal relationships, one businessman
stated, “To be frank with you, how can my employees sue me and win the
case in local courts? The head of the Labor Bureau is my friend. I go to the
parties. I hang out with local officials. Then my problems can be solved on
the spot.”149
In short, the functions of trade associations are twofold. On the one
hand, they are designed to give the state control over organized interests in
http://big5.xinhuanet.com /gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-01/31/content_5678991.htm (last
visited July 15, 2014).
146
Interview with the director of a Taiwanese Merchant Association in Shanghai, in Changning
District, Shanghai (June 2006).
147
For instance, TMAs can issue such administrative notice to tax and customs agencies,
communicating their members’ concerns.
148
AEFIs, the other branch of trade associations for foreign investors, share with TMAs similar
organizational features. A group of local officials whose responsibility is related to economic climate and
institutions serve as the advisors of the AEFIs. In Shanghai AEFI, for instance, the deputy-mayor, the
chairman of Economic and Trade Commission, and the deputy director of Municipal People’s Congress
serve as the honorific presidents, and the head of the Customs Office, the deputy director of the Shanghai
Foreign Exchange Management Bureau, the deputy director of the Municipal Statistics Bureau, and other
senior officials of the Municipal Labor and Social Security Bureau serve as consultants. See Shanghai
AEFI Charter, SHANGHAI AEFI, http://www.saefi.org.cn/mix/saefi/txt.jsp?pub_info=3097 (last visited July
15, 2014).
149
See, e.g., Straits Exchange Foundation, 61 STRAIT BUSINESS MONTHLY 37 (1997).
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society.150 By empowering a single organization to represent the sectorial
interests of individuals and firms, the state aggregates foreign investors into
a sole association. This is beneficial for the state’s ability to manage,
monitor, and allocate land property rights to foreign investors.151 On the
other hand, the trade associations were themselves responses to the failure of
the simple reputation mechanism, representing a further institutional
arrangement. 152 It is advantageous for the government to breach its
commitments and abuse the property rights of some investors once lands
become scarce and land prices are soaring.153 Foreign investors must act
collectively to further institutionalize their informal arrangements because
commitment obtained through informal arrangements is a private good
rather than a public one.
VI.

ANALYZING INSTITUTIONAL SUBSTITUTES AS A DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGY

This article suggests that foreign investors have been able to develop
multiple types of substitutes for property institutions depending on market
and institutional conditions in respective regions or industries. In regards to
this process, China is by no means unique. In the context of Asian
developing countries, the comparative law literature has documented how
the government becomes one of many interest groups and adopts a
responsive regulatory approach by using state power to sensitize decisionmaking to industry needs rather than imposing substantive objectives.154
Vietnam and Indonesia are the other two cases on point.155 In fact, in most
developing countries, as Frank Upham argues, informal and alternative
property rights institutions appear to be more relevant to economic growth
150
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Historically, this approach is not unique to China. The merchant guilds in Medieval Europe also
held certain regulatory powers and coordinated merchants’ responses to a ruler’s conduct. See AVNER
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than formal ones. 156 In this regard, law and economics theorists have
examined the informal norms by which property relationships can be sorted
out and arranged without using law.157 Michael Trebilcock and Mariana
Prado, two leading law and development theorists, have also proposed the
idea of “institutional bypass” to describe how various institutions have been
established to overcome social-cultural-historical obstacles to reforms.158
This article focuses on both norms and institutions and applies the
notion of “institutional substitute” as a means to better capture the dynamism
of property rights in China. In light of the forms and complexity of various
substitutes uncovered by the fieldwork of this article, the notions of
“formal/informal” or “property/non-property” institutions do not seem to be
able to characterize the dynamic operations of these substitutive institutions.
Similarly, “institutional bypass” may not be a good metaphor here because
institutional substitutes are annexed to multiple segments of the legal
system; they do not bypass but are embedded in each other. As this article
demonstrates, property substitutes have been made possible by a mix of
formal and informal institutional settings based not only on property law, but
also on contract and corporate law. However, while land (precisely
speaking, state leases) is formally owned by the project company pursuant to
property law, the transferability of property interests in land is made possible
informally through the Company Law, which is a formal statute.
Nonetheless, the forms of the substitute and the patterns of these
hedging practices are heavily context-dependent. For instance, the nature of
the foreign investors’ businesses may affect their institutional preference.
Small companies with short payback periods (e.g., clothing manufacturing
firms) may prefer the contractual approach in order to access land quickly,
whereas companies aiming to profit from future transfers of land (e.g., real
estate developers) may apply the corporate law approach so that they can
easily transact land in the form of shares. Other factors matter too, such as
the business scale, the remoteness of target markets and the law enforcement
climate in various regions. Given the variations in institutional settings,
these substitutes are further supplemented by social norms, changes in
business behaviors, and collective actions through trade associations. As a
result, demands for the security of property rights, alienability, and effective
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dispute resolutions have been fulfilled well enough to sustain the current
record levels of FDI.
That said, the institutional substitute remains questionable as to
whether it serves as a sustainable development strategy. The underlying
structure of substitutes and the regulatory framework that makes these
substitutes possible deserves further evaluation in terms of long-term
sustainability. The mechanisms of various substitutes demonstrate how
institutional speculators can take advantage of the configurations of multiple
regulatory regimes or different segments of the legal system, piggybacking
on the one with lower transaction costs and/or lax regulatory standards (e.g.,
contract or corporate laws) in order to create substitutes for the other
characteristic of higher risks or costs (e.g., insufficient property regime). In
this way, market players can compensate for existing institutional deficits by
leveraging comparative institutional advantages within multiple regulatory
regimes, thereby fulfilling their institutional demands. In this sense,
substitutes are not only the functional equivalent of the property system.
Rather, they have turned the property system into, metaphorically, a
customized quilt that consists of various functional equivalents tailored from
other segments of the legal system. Settlers in the American colonies
devised quilting as a way to sew together small scraps of fabric by hand,
creating warm bedding with multiple layers in a relatively quick and cheap
manner; likewise, market actors in the early stage of economic development
also establish institutional substitutes swiftly by a patchwork of different
segments of law with layers of configurations catering to various functions.
Like financial arbitrage and hedging, using substitutes as a law and
economic development strategy is by no means risk-free. Rather, it may go
well most of the time, but could become highly unstable when the tides turn.
Incrementally, risks associated with institutional weaknesses in one area
(e.g., insufficient property rights) can flow into less-regulated markets or the
domain of less-stringent institutions that operations of substitutes rely upon.
For example, when landowners apply the corporate law approach to transfer
their land interests in land in the form of shares, property law will not govern
such de facto property transactions. Competing property interests not
disclosed in the transaction, such as banks’ mortgage interests, may
subsequently give rise to disputes and impede efficient use of the land. As a
result, risks of ambiguous property rights eventually flow into contract,
banking, or corporate law regimes upon which property substitutes rely. In
other words, institutional substitutes simply distribute the risks to a wider
pool. It makes transactions possible in the short term, but may eventually
lead to deficiencies in other parts of the legal system.
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In the long term, the government has to streamline these
interdependent legal relationships for the sake of efficiency and legal justice.
Success depends on whether the government can reduce the switching cost.
With respect to less interlocked arrangements, the government may
incentivize a switch by legalizing the existing property arrangements. For
example, local governments have tried to legalize land titles obtained
through SMFs as long as they pay evaded taxes and levies. However, the
switching cost is much higher in institutional settings that have interlocked
with each other. Think about this hypothetically: a piece of land had been
illegally transferred by project companies five times in the course of five
years before a foreign buyer finally bought it and built an office building.
The construction was financed by a number of bank loans secured by the
land and building in question. Given the number of parties involved and
various legal relationships created, how can the illegality be dealt with while
striking a balance between efficiency and fairness? This issue has aroused
legal debates between practitioners as well as policymakers. What if this is
not just one case, but one out of 1,000 similar cases in a region? For some
pragmatic officials, the best solution is not to fix it as long as it does not fall
apart.
In short, it remains debatable whether institutional substitutes can be
used as a sustainable development strategy. There are three underlying
problems. First, risks cannot be dissolved by institutional substitutes and
can only be distributed to a less-regulated market or governance regime that
does not cater to regulating the subject matter in question. As previously
discussed, substitutes for making the property alienable simply transfer the
risks caused by incomplete property rights to the banking system, where the
lands in question are often put up as collateral. Second, substitutes would be
vulnerable to any changes in market conditions that can destabilize the
balance of power between participants. For example, the soaring price of
land may change landlords’ cost-benefit equation, tempting them to default
on the contractual agreements that have constructed existing substitutes. In
fact, this dynamic has accounted for reportedly increased land disputes
between local government and ethnically Chinese foreign investors.159 Last,
substitutes may impede structural reforms by interlocking defective
institutions, thus increasing the switch costs down the road. Cronyism and
159

YUNG-HSIANG CHEN ET AL, STUDIES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION TAIWANESE INVESTORS IN CHINA
107-113 (2011), available at http://www.ntpu.edu.tw/college/e10/files/research/2011123017 1303.pdf (last
visited 10 Oct. 2014) (in Chinese); Ming-Chang Chen, Land Disputes and Policy Advice for Taiwanese
Investors in China, Journal of Taiwanese Investors, No.154 (2011), available at http://www.chinabiz.
org.tw /News/GetJournalShow?pid=162&cat_id=174&gid=14&id=194 (last visited 10 Oct 2014) (in
Chinese).

JANUARY 2015

ARBITRAGE FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS

95

vested interests may distort policymaking and law enforcement, and they
may fail even the most dedicated reformists. Such increasing difficulty in
implementing reforms has been manifested in various pressing issues in
China today, including rampant corruption and land grabs. If not contained,
these problems will seriously undermine the sustainability of institutional
substitutes.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the 1990s, a body of scholarship mainly authored by economists
and sociologists has suggested competing theories to explain China’s
unorthodox economic achievements in spite of its resilient state-owned land
system. Most scholars pointed to an informal or hidden privatization
through a pragmatic and deliberate ambiguity of property rights in land.160
However, exactly what legal institutions have facilitated this hidden
privatization remains largely unexplored in previous literature. This article’s
main contribution is uncovering the dynamic and diverse institutional
settings underlying this phenomenon by engaging with interdisciplinary
property rights theories to unveil various substitute forms, their institutional
configurations, and the mechanisms that the operations rely upon.
In fact, the findings also resonate with the idea of legal pluralism that
comparative law theorists have long emphasized. Institutional substitutes
shed light on the interaction between state and non-state actors, formal and
informal regulations, and the processes by which laws and norms are
transplanted from the ‘center’ to the ‘periphery’ and localized in a global
context.161 Comparative law scholars often use the analogy of mixing oil
and water when discussing encounters between Western and Eastern legal
systems. Some use this analogy to suggest the resistance and inevitable
divergence between the two systems in the process of legal transplant, while
others focus on the aspect of harmonization that may lead to a certain level
of convergence down the road. In contrast, the findings of this article
suggest that the story of China’s property substitutes is one of alchemy:
producing oil from water, or the other way around. If the legal institutions
in question are not satisfactory to market participants, what happens when
160
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the strong market force (namely, FDI) comes into contact with the
indigenous legal tradition and institutions? Among property, contract, and
corporate law in China, it seems that each form may be tailored into the
functional equivalent of other form under suitable conditions, creating
localized solutions for institutional deficits.
In addition to conventional property law, this article has identified two
more approaches that could manufacture property rights through institutional
substitutes!contractual and corporate law approaches. The choice of
suitable approach depends on various factors, including local institutional
settings, law enforcement culture, the scale and nature of the businesses, the
way in which market players perceive and calculate risks, and regional
market conditions. As each property substitute consists of formal and
informal, as well as property and non-property laws, it makes the bifurcated
notion of “formal/informal” and “property/non-property” insufficient to
capture this dynamic trajectory of property rights.
Nonetheless, these institutional substitutes do not seem to represent a
sustainable development strategy in either legal or economic terms. For
foreign investors, institutional substitutes probably serve well for the
purpose of hedging against risks of insufficient property institutions in the
short term. In the long term, however, changes in economic conditions and
market status could destabilize the overarching structure of the substitutes by
increasing tangible and intangible costs for maintaining such substitutes, or,
even worse, could fail existing substitutes. Along with market development,
increasingly complex business transactions need to be facilitated by more
sophisticated legal institutions. American, European, and other nonethnically Chinese investors, who have diversified China’s FDI sources and
probably share neither cultural ties nor similar views about the role of law
with locals, may not be able to replicate the substitutes created by overseas
Chinese investors. Institutional substitutes simply distribute, rather than
dissolve, risks to other areas of law that various substitutes rely upon,
making defective institutions interlock with each other. Consequently, the
switching costs of moving from substitutive to formal institutions may
increase accordingly towards an irreversible point. In short, stages of
economic development matter and the policies required to initiate a
transition may be qualitatively different from those required to sustain the
transition.
China’s experiences have shed light on the evolution of legal
institutions and demonstrated diverse trajectories therein. Developing
through substitutes, among other factors, has helped China lift more than
500 million people out of poverty—a remarkable record in human history.
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However, it has limitations, some of which are economically debilitating.
Karl Marx captured the path of his fellow socialists’ switch from
communism to capitalism when he said, “Men make their own history . . .
not under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing
already.”162 Drawn from past traditions and applying borrowed laws and
various substitutes, we shall witness how the evolution of institutions in
China and her fellow developing countries brings to light other dimensions
of the legal system in the years to come.
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